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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides background information on trade remedies under the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) namely, anti-dumping, countervailing measures and safeguards. The 
chapter further explains the current situation in Tanzania with respect to subsidies imports and 
the implementation of countervailing measures. The research questions, objectives, scope and 
significance of the study are also explained. The chapter ends with an outline of the five chapters 
of the study. 
1.2 Background 
Trade remedies or trade defences are contingent measures enacted to protect domestic producers 
where instances of unfair trade practice occur or to prevent or remedy serious injury and to 
facilitate adjustment.
1
 The survival of domestic producers facing pressure from foreign 
competition and unfair trade practices has for long been one of the greatest concerns of 
governments.
2
 Under a multilateral global trading system, the WTO is the body responsible for 
regulating world trade.
3
 Member states, whether developed or developing nation, have a right to 
use trade remedies.
 4
 
 
The WTO members have retained their right to impose trade remedies,
5
 such as, anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties, to correct the competitive imbalances created by unfair trade practices, 
such as dumping and subsidies, when these cause injury. They have also agreed on multilateral 
disciplines governing the granting of subsidies. Member states are also allowed to apply 
safeguard measures in case of a surge of imports that causes, or threatens to cause, serious 
injury.
6
 
                                                          
1
 Illy O Trade remedies in Africa: Experience, Challenges and prospectus (2012)1GEG Working Paper.  
2
 Illy O (2012).  
3
 Meltzer S & Nzimande M „South Africa‟s trade relations and use of trade remedies: Anti dumping in South Africa 
‟(2011)2 SA Webber Wetzel. 
4
 Articles VI and XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. 
5
 Articles VI and XIX of the GATT 1994. 
6
 World Trade Organization, WTO e learning: The WTO Multilateral Trade Agreements (2011) 209. 
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Apart from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Agreements relevant to 
trade remedies on a multilateral level, the WTO rules can be implemented by member states in 
the form of domestic legislation to attempt to mitigate the adverse impacts of various trade 
practices on domestic industries.
7
 Anti-dumping laws
8
, for instance, provide relief to domestic 
industries that have suffered material injury or are threatened with material injury as a result of 
competing imports being sold at prices shown to be less than their normal value. Countervailing 
duty laws
9
 provide a similar form of relief to domestic industries that have been or may be 
injured by foreign subsidies on competing imports.
10
 
 
On the other hand, safeguard laws provide for temporary trade restrictions, typically tariffs or 
quotas, which are imposed in response to overwhelming import surges, usually as a result of 
trade concessions that cause serious injury or threat thereof to competing domestic producers.
11
 
However, the present study will only focus on countervailing measures, as one of the available 
WTO remedies and Tanzania, which is a member state of the WTO and is grouped as a 
developing country. The study also provides a comparative analysis of the countervailing 
measures law and practices of the European Union (EU) and Brazil. The rationale behind this is 
to provide lesson(s) which Tanzania can learn from the traditional users of countervailing 
measures.  
 
It is an undisputable fact that countervailing measures are a long-term exception to the 
fundamental WTO principle that tariffs should be equally applied to all trading member 
countries as far as the Most -Favoured -Nation (MFN) principle is concerned. This practice 
became legitimate and was incorporated under Article VI of the GATT which subsequently 
became part of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO in 1994, followed by the special 
                                                          
7
  Jones VC „Trade Remedies and the WTO Negotiations „(2010) 1 Congressional Research Services.  
8
 Article VI of the GATT. 
9
 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (1994). 
10
 Jones VC (2010). 
11
 Illy O (2012). 
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Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) 
12
  in terms of which 
Tanzania as a signatory state
13
 is empowered to use these measures. The SCM Agreement 
confirms that WTO member states may apply countervailing measures in instances where a 
domestic industry is injured by imported products which benefit from government or public body 
subsidies.
14
  
 
Two different methods can be used to address subsidies paid by foreign governments, namely, 
bilateral countervailing action and multilateral dispute resolution in the WTO.
15
  Furthermore, 
where subsidised exports cause material injury to an industry in the importing country, 
authorities in the importing country may take action in the form of additional customs 
(countervailing) duties to offset either the margin of subsidisation or the injury caused by the 
subsidised imports.
16
 Also, as an alternative member states can opt to use dispute settlement as 
has been provided under the GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement.
17
 
 
Tanzania‟s Development Vision 2025 focuses on consolidating gains on the macro-economic 
front and to face the economic challenges that lie ahead. In addition, trade is seen as a central and 
pivotal pillar in the attainment of efficiency, productivity and international competitiveness.
18
 As 
a consequence, the sound and effective use of trade remedies, such as countervailing measures, is 
also considered inseparable from the development of trade in Tanzania. Following from this 
motive, the Tanzanian Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures Act 
19
was enacted in 2004 to 
make provision for anti-dumping and countervailing measures with the specific aim to provide 
for the administration and regulation of dumping and subsidies and related matters.  
 
                                                          
12
 See Australia Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade „Productivity Commission Inquiry: 
Antidumping and Countervailing System‟ available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/productivity_commission_inquiry.html (accessed on 11 September 2012). 
13
 Tanzania becomes a member of the WTO in 1995. 
14
 Article 10 of the SCM Agreement.  
15
 Brink G‟A nutshell guide to countervailing action‟ (2008)2 Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria.  
16
 Brink G (2008). 
17
 Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994 and Article 30 of the SCM Agreement.   
18
 Ministry of industry and trade, The United Republic of Tanzania -Trade policy for a competitive economy and 
export-led growth (2003). 
19
 The Tanzanian Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures Act, 2004. 
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Tanzania as a member of the WTO is open to trade liberalisation policies and has consequently 
opened its market to imports from various global trading partners. For this reason, it is vital to 
protect domestic industries from material injury or threats of injury caused by subsidised imports 
in order to maintain fair trade within the country, and therefore making relevant the proper use, 
application and implementation of countervailing measures by the country.  
 
Tanzania is affected by subsidised imports like most of developing nations. For example, 
Tanzania‟s cement manufacturers have, on several occasions, pleaded for the government to 
protect cement firms specifically. Stakeholders have always complained that imported cement is 
sold cheaply because Pakistan, India, China and Egypt heavily subsidise their producers.
20
 
Indeed the prices of imported cement are said to be lower than those for locally made cement due 
to the fact that in the countries of origin the manufacturers are empowered by export subsidies or 
lower production costs.
21
 Furthermore, agriculture is considered to be one of the key sectors 
which facilitate economic growth, but like many other developing countries Tanzania‟s 
agricultural commodities have been challenged by subsidised agricultural commodities, such as 
sugar.
22
 Therefore it is very important for Tanzania to protect its local agricultural industries. 
 
As regards its domestic legislation the (2004 Anti-dumping and Countervailing Act), Tanzania 
does not have supporting regulations for its application. In comparison, South Africa for 
example, in addition to the principal enabling Act
23
 on applying and enforcing countervailing 
measures, also has in place countervailing measures regulations,
24
 the International Trade 
Administration Act
25
, and a competent authority namely, the International Trade Administration 
Commission (ITAC). Therefore, apart from a comprehensive primary legislative framework, 
Tanzania does not have in place, regulations, administrative procedures and a competent 
                                                          
20
 See The Citizen „Plea to protect cement firms fall on deaf ears‟ available at 
http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/Pleatoprotectcementfirmsfallsondeafears/21June2012 (accessed on 15 September 2012). 
21
 See Business Times Economic and Financial weekly „Cement wars: Imports vs. Domestic product‟ available at 
http://www.businesstimes.co.tz/cementwars:importsvs.domesticproduct/21May2010  (accessed on 15 September 
2012). 
22
 Hartzernberg T et al Cape to Cairo making the tripartite free trade area work (2011). 
23
 International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002. 
24
  South Africa Countervailing Regulations, 2005. 
25
 71 of 2002 
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institutional framework to apply and implement countervailing duties to counter unfair trade 
practices. 
 
Practically most developing countries from Africa, Tanzania being one of them, are traditionally 
not the major users of the trade policy instruments referred to as countervailing measures. Key 
possible reasons for this are the lack of competent national legislation which enables them to 
utilise these trade measures, socio-political concerns in terms of the distribution of power among 
WTO member countries, and the threat of retaliation.
26
 In addition, they lack adequate and 
experienced institutional frameworks to implement such measures. 
 
 Developing countries generally refrain from effectively utilising subsidies to support their local 
producers or implementing countervailing duties against developed countries because of the 
latter‟s importance as significant target markets for their exports, lack of capability and capacity 
to defend their exports against unfair trade practices, and the fear of retaliation from more 
powerful trading countries. In addition, a lack of financial and institutional resources and 
suitably skilled human capital are among the reasons why Tanzania fails to utilise available trade 
remedy measures.
27
 
 Various arguments have been presented as to why developing nations fail to utilise trade remedy 
measures but none has tried to explore in depth the challenges and constraints facing such 
nation(s) in the implementation of countervailing measures.
28
 The present study seeks to explore 
the experiences, challenges and constraints confronting Tanzania as a developing country in 
administering countervailing measures, and to provide solutions for the effective use and 
implementation of countervailing measures in situations of unfair trade, as little has been written 
on this area of trade law in Tanzania. 
                                                          
26
 World Trade Organisation Report 2009-Trade policy commitments and contingency measures (2009). 
27
 Hartzernberg T „et al‟(2011)124. 
28
 Illy O (2012). 
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1.3 Problem statement 
Countervailing measures as an international trade tool aim to promote fair trade, create a shield 
of protection, and act as a tool of economic growth for WTO member states. In practice, SCM 
Agreement facilitates the application of redress measures in circumstances of unfair trade. The 
WTO‟s Subsidies and Countervailing Measures discipline the use of subsidies and it also 
regulates the actions countries can take to counter the effects of subsidies. The Agreement also 
explains in detail that member states can make use of the WTO‟s dispute settlement procedure to 
redress the adverse effects of the subsidies, and upon fulfilling the requirements, a country can 
lawfully impose countervailing duties on subsidised imports that are found to be hurting 
domestic producers. When implementing such duties, developing member states, such as 
Tanzania, may preserve the principle of non-discrimination, referred to as the Most - Favoured -
Nation (MFN) principle.
29
 
Every WTO member has an equal chance of grabbing this opportunity of implementing 
countervailing measures against subsidised imports either by imposing countervailing duty or 
lesser duty where desirable, or approaching the WTO dispute mechanism. Yet reality illustrates 
that it is only the developed countries, such as the EU and the United States, which are active 
users of the countervailing measures in full. On the other hand, developing countries, such as 
Tanzania, fail to make use of them.
30
 
 
This study seeks to examine the challenges and constraints confronting Tanzania in the 
implementation of countervailing measures, to solve the significant question as to why Tanzania 
fails to utilise countervailing measures in the face of the adverse effects of unfair trade practices 
from subsidised imports, and to explore whether it is feasible to apply and implement 
countervailing measures. 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Article 1 of the GATT 1994. 
30
 Hartzernberg T „et al‟ (2011)124. 
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1.4 Research questions  
General question: 
i) To examine the constraints and challenges faced in the implementation of 
countervailing measures in Tanzania. 
Specific questions: 
i) To examine the prevailing WTO mechanisms for countervailing measures in 
addressing unfair trade practices; 
 
ii) To identify reasons that prevent Tanzania from the active utilisation of 
countervailing measures; 
 
iii) To examine the possible lesson(s) which Tanzania can learn from the EU and 
Brazilian laws and practices on the use and implementation of countervailing 
measures; 
 
iv) What are the challenges and constraints faced in the implementation of 
countervailing measures in Tanzania? 
 
v) Which approach can Tanzania opt to use in implementing countervailing 
measures: the lesser duty rule or the community interest test or both? 
 
vi) What kind of legal reform and practices should Tanzania adopt for the proper, 
adequate use and implementation of countervailing measures? 
1.5 Significance of the study 
This study is aims to contribute to what has been said on the WTO trade remedies and 
developing nations, and, moreover, to explore the possible benefits for developing countries by 
using countervailing measures. The key focus is Tanzania as a developing country and the study 
seeks to explore the reasons why developing countries fail to utilise this unlimited opportunity to 
outmost.  
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Furthermore, this study will hopefully provide not only Tanzania but also other developing 
countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), legal scholars and non-legal practitioners, 
academicians and policy makers with adequate knowledge about trade remedies also known as 
contingency measures, and particularly on the applicability and implementation of countervailing 
measures by developing countries. Lastly, the proposed reforms, such as ,an institutional, 
regulatory framework in Tanzania, and third party participation to the WTO dispute settlement 
process , to mention a few ,will provide a clear path on how to deal with international trade 
remedies and to be informed on the current global market place. 
1.6 Scope of the study 
This study has as its focus the applicability and implementation of the WTO countervailing 
measures by developing countries and with Tanzania being the country under examination, by 
exploring the challenges and constraints faced in the implementation of the SCM Agreement. 
Further, it provides answers to the question why Tanzania does not effectively utilise 
countervailing measures as a trade contingency measure. Furthermore, the study incorporates a 
comparative analysis of Tanzania‟s anti-subsidy legislation with that of the EU and Brazil. 
This research however, will not embark on any economic analysis, but where necessary, 
reference shall be made to economic authorities. The key focus of this paper is to undertake a 
legal analysis of the use and implementation of countervailing measures as a tool of international 
trade redress in unfair trade situations. 
1.7 Research methodology 
This study has been facilitated by desktop research. Specifically, the review of the GATT 1994 
Article VI, the SCM Agreement, the Tanzania Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures Act. 
Further, a comparative study on the EU and Brazilian anti-subsidy legislation, reason behind is 
that EU has been viewed as a role model and active user of the WTO instruments while Brazil is 
an example of a developing country, which has been active user of the trade remedies such as 
countervailing measures. Hence, there are lessons which Tanzania can opt to follow from active 
users of the countervailing measures against subsidised imports. 
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Secondary sources of information relating to this study include relevant journal articles, 
discussion papers, and reports on countervailing measures, trade policy, the WTO cases, books, 
internet information, and research on issues of relevant study. 
1.8  Chapter outline 
CHAPTER ONE Provides general background information to the study, together with a 
statement of the problem. The chapter identifies the study‟s objectives, 
both general and specific, and both the rationale for as well as limitations 
of the study. 
CHAPTER TWO  Provides an overview of trade remedies under the WTO, namely, anti-
dumping, countervailing measures, and safeguards. The chapter also 
details the operation of the WTO countervailing measures as well as the 
substantive and procedural requirements.  
 
CHAPTER 3  Gives an overview of the present situation relating to subsidised imports 
in Tanzania. Then examines the reasons preventing Tanzania from using 
countervailing measures against subsidies.Then Follows a discussion of 
the challenges and constraints confronting the implementation of 
countervailing measures in Tanzania. Lastly it provides a comparative 
assessment of the EU and Brazilian countervailing measures law and 
practices. 
CHAPTER 4  Provides for an analysis of the findings on the implementation of 
countervailing measures in Tanzania as well as a way forward on the use 
of such trade remedy by the country. 
CHAPTER 5  Provides a conclusion as well as recommendations on the implementation 
of countervailing measures in Tanzania. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AN OVERVIEW OF TRADE REMEDIES AND THE APPLICATION OF 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES IN TERMS OF THE WTO. 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents a detailed account of the jurisprudential nature of countervailing measures 
as one of the trade remedies which the WTO Members can use in reaction to unfair trade 
practices. Since one can never start explaining a measure without indicating from where it 
originated, the chapter starts by providing the historical background to the multilateral trading 
system, that is, from the GATT to the WTO. Further, it identifies in nutshell the available trade 
remedies, namely, anti-dumping, safeguards and countervailing measures. This is followed by a 
discussion on the subsidies and countervailing measures.  
2.2  Historical view of the multilateral trading system: from the GATT to the WTO 
The Second World War had great impact, both politically and economically. For instance, 
countries were economically disrupted; hence the need to construct a worldwide economy was 
on the scheduled agenda in the 1940‟s. As the result, in 1944 the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference was held at Bretton Woods, United States. Among others, government 
authorities reached the conclusion that in order to restore the world trade system to a better 
position, there must be the creation of three international organisations, namely, the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the International Trade Organisation (ITO).
31
 
Indeed, the ITO was vested with the responsibility of promoting trade by lowering trade barriers 
among countries. However, the ITO never came into existence, the reason behind such a key 
failure being that no major country ratified the ITO Charter at the United Nations Havana 
Conference. Nevertheless, 23 countries adopted a related provisional arrangement of the ITO 
                                                          
31
 International Trade Centre Business guide to Trade remedies in Brazil: Anti-Dumping, Countervailing and 
Safeguard Legislation Practices and Procedures (2009) 1. 
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Charter related to negotiations on tariffs and trade the GATT which came into effect on 1 
January 1947. The GATT included an international agreement establishing a set of rules for 
conducting international trade and a provisional structure to administer the Agreement.
32
 
Throughout it‟s virtually 50 years of incidence; GATT became a platform for periodical rounds 
of negotiations. For instance, from 1947 to 1994, there were almost eight rounds of negotiations 
under the auspices of the GATT. The impact from such negotiations hit the multilateral trade 
system positively whereas; the first five rounds were able to accomplish the lowering of tariffs. 
Thus, the Kennedy Round of 1963 to 1967 and the Tokyo Round of 1973 to 1979 not only 
proficient tariff reductions, but consistently introduced a series of agreements on non-tariff 
barriers. Although the Kennedy Round introduced an Anti-Dumping Code the negotiations under 
the Tokyo Round resulted on the other hand, „in a series of codes concerning subsidies and 
countervailing duties, customs valuation, government procurement, import licensing procedures 
and technical barriers to trade‟ among others.33 
In addition to the above discussions, the final round of negotiations under the GATT, namely, the 
Uruguay Round of 1986 to 1994, focused at consolidating the prevailing disciplines and bringing 
new topics into discussion. As the end result, after seven years of negotiations, the Final Act 
incorporating the Uruguay Round an agreement was signed in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994. The 
Final Act also recognised the creation of an international body in the field of international trade, 
the WTO, which came into being on 1 January 1995. The WTO continued and improved the 
GATT arrangement. It incorporated the reorganised GATT regulations (GATT 1994) and 
expanded the framework of the separate agreements on services, investments and intellectual 
property rights. Further, it adopted a dispute settlement mechanism which lends efficiency to the 
decisions of the WTO.
34
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2.3 The WTO and the available trade remedies: a history in a nutshell  
Trade remedies have been in the multilateral trading system since 1947.The discipline regarding 
to such trade instruments has been enforced over the eight rounds of negotiations under the 
GATT. The landmark is obtained under Article VI of the GATT which sets forth general rules 
dominating the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties; Article XVI covers 
general provisions on subsidies; and Article XIX establishes the probability for the GATT 
contracting party to use safeguard measures to protect its industries from increased imports.
35
 
By definition trade remedies are trade policy tools that allow governments to take remedial 
action against imports which are causing or threaten to cause injury to a domestic industry. Such 
tools are more efficient compared to domestic ones and they are legitimate actions under the 
WTO terms.
36
 According to the SCM Agreement 
37
 „domestic industry‟ has been interpreted as 
referring to  
„the domestic producers as a whole of the like products to those of them whose collective output 
of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products 
except that when such producers are related to the exporters or importers or are themselves 
importers of the allegedly subsidised product or a like product from the other countries,.....‟.  
The definition lack some clarity, whereby it has failed to provide in detail some key terms such 
as defining what is like product. Under the WTO the term like product has been debatable due to 
the fact that the GATT and the SCM Agreement does not define what is „like product‟. Latter the 
SCM Agreement also did not provide a straight forward definition of the term apart from 
providing general reference in the footnote.
38
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According to the WTO case law, namely, Japan-Alcohol and European Community –Asbestos39, 
it was held that there is no “one precise and absolute definition” of the term “like”. Reasonably, 
the scope of the term varies contingent on the context of the provision, the object and purpose of 
the provision, and the object and purpose of the agreement in which it appears. Additionally, in 
the European Community –Asbestos matter the Appellate Body first noted that the dictionary 
meaning of “like” suggests that “like products” means products “that share a number of identical 
or similar characteristics or qualities”.40 However this definition did not make available, on its 
own, a clear meaning for the term “like”. 
Referring to prior GATT/WTO precedent, the Appellate Body noted that the determination of 
“likeness” must be made on a “case-by-case basis”. Furthermore, it noted that four general 
criteria have been examined in past reports to determine “likeness”: 
 
(i) The properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end-uses of the products; (iii) 
consumers' tastes and habits in particular, more comprehensively termed consumers' perceptions 
and behaviour in respect of the products; and (iv) the tariff classification of the products.
41
 
 
Lastly in the  Korea-Alcohol case
42
 , the panel stated that an assessment of what amount to a like 
product(s) can also have it legal basis  on whether a "direct competitive" relationship between 
products exists .Nevertheless it requires evidence that consumers consider the products to be 
“alternative ways” of satisfying a particular need or taste. Specifically when the domestic and 
imported products at issue are directly competitive or substitutable, an examination of which 
requires evidence of the direct competitive relationship between the products there must be 
comparisons of their physical characteristics, end-uses, channels of distribution and prices .
43
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2.3.1 Anti-dumping 
The development of international anti-dumping regimes originated from national laws. The 
landmark legislation on domestic anti-dumping was adopted by Canada in 1904. Such specific 
legislation was created out of fear of dumping of goods from Europe and America at a cheap 
price, with the apparent intention to control the Canadian Market.
44
 Similarly followed by the 
United States in its 1916 Anti-dumping Act, „as a result of fears of cartel-like systematic 
dumping from Europe with the intent to destroy the younger industries in the United States in 
order to monopolise trade and commerce after wiping out competitors‟.45 
Thereafter, due to the continued existence of domestic anti-dumping laws in industrialised 
countries, such as, the United States and others, who were the key proponents of the ITO, anti-
dumping provisions were contained in the American proposal for the still-born ITO and 
eventually became part of the 1947 GATT. The original rules of the GATT received extensive 
revisions in 1947 and 1979. Eventually, efforts by some countries to tighten anti-dumping 
disciplines achieved modest success by the adoption of a new agreement on anti-dumping known 
as the Agreement for the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994.
46
 
At present, WTO member states can apply remedial action if a company exports a product at a 
place lower than the price it normally charges in its own home market. This is legally termed as 
“dumping’’ of the product. In a situation of unfair trade, such as dumping of a product, the WTO 
Agreement allows governments to act against the dumping where there is material injury to the 
competing domestic industry. In order to do that the government has to show that dumping is 
taking place, calculate the extent of the dumping (that is, how much lower the export price is 
compared to the exporter‟s home market price ), as well as show that the dumping is causing 
injury or threatens to do so.
47
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Moreover Article VI of the GATT allows countries to take action against dumping while the 
Anti-dumping Agreement clarified and expanded this provision. Therefore, in summary, one can 
define anti-dumping action as imposing an  extra import duty on the particular product from the 
exporting country in order to bring its price closer to its “normal value‟‟.48  
Furthermore, the determination of offsetting dumping requires a price similarity between a 
product's “normal value” and its “export price”. „A product is to be regarded as being “dumped” 
when introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its “normal value”, likewise, 
if the “export price” of the product when sold in the importing country is less than its “normal 
value”, that is, the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product in the 
market of the exporting country‟.49 
However the Agreement on Anti-dumping applies only to goods and the GATT does not include 
provisions on dumping of services.
50
 
2.3.2 Safeguards 
The development of international regimes on safeguards has followed a pattern similar to the 
anti-dumping rules. Safeguard provisions had been in existence in the national practices of major 
industrial countries long before they were adopted as multilateral trade remedies.
51
 In 1935, the 
United States incorporated an escape clause in the bilateral trade agreement with Belgium under 
which the United States would be entitled to withdraw from the tariff concession as a result of 
the extension of such concession to third countries causing an excessively large increase in the 
importation of products.
52
 
 Similar provisions were later included in trade agreements with other countries such as Sweden, 
The Netherlands and Mexico. Thus, this escape clause becomes the precursor of a similar 
provision in the American proposal to establish the ITO, that tariff concessions may be 
suspended or withdrawn if increased imports cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
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49
 WTO E-learning (2010) 211. 
50
 Wolfrum R & Kobele M WTO: Trade Remedies (2008)1. 
51
 Wolfrum R & Kobele M (2008)1. 
52
 Eckes A (1995)260. 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
industry.
53
 Under the current situation in the WTO, a member may restrict imports of a product 
temporarily if its domestic industry is injured or threatened with injury caused by a surge in 
imports. The legal provision for this emergency protection from imports is provided by Article 
XIX of the GATT.  
The same have been clarified and reinforced by the Agreement on Safeguards. Specifically, an 
import „‟surge‟‟ justifying safeguard action can be a real increase in imports, whether an absolute 
increase or relative increase, whereby there is an increase in the imports share of a shrinking 
market even if the imports quantity has not increased. In practice industries or companies may 
request safeguard action by their government.
54
 
2.3 .3 Countervailing measures 
The third type of trade remedy is known as a countervailing measure with the aim to offset the 
effect brought about by a subsidy. Under the SCM Agreement, a country can use the WTO's 
dispute settlement procedure to pursue the withdrawal of the subsidy or the elimination of its 
adverse effects. Or the country can host its own investigation and eventually apply a 
countervailing measure on subsidised imports that cause injuring to domestic producers.
55
 
Despite the fact that under the WTO three types of trade remedies exist, this study will only 
focus on one countervailing measures and more discussion of the countervailing measures will 
be provided in the  reminder of the  study.  
2.3.4 Differences between the WTO trade remedies 
 Although anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties and safeguard measures are mechanisms 
used to restrain the amount of imports into a country, there are substantive differences between 
them. While anti-dumping and countervailing duties are used to remedy the effects of unfair 
competition, safeguard measures are used to allow a domestic industry to adjust to trade 
liberalisation. In this sense, the investigation process for the imposition of a countervailing duty 
is very similar to the anti-dumping investigation process, since both investigations concern unfair 
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trade practices. Safeguard investigations, on the other hand, are significantly different from anti-
dumping and countervailing duty investigations as the fairness or unfairness of the imports is not 
considered.
56
 
A substantial difference between anti-dumping and countervailing measures concerns the nature 
of the agents involved in the practice of dumping and subsidisation. Dumping relates to business 
activities between private companies, whereas subsidization is a financial contribution made by a 
government or public body which confer benefit to the recipient.
57
 
2.4 Historical background of subsidies and countervailing measures 
Prior to the internationalisation of regulations against subsidies, domestic laws against foreign 
subsidies were common among industrialised countries. In the United States, for example, 
provisions against subsidies were enacted against imports of beet sugar from Europe in as early 
as 1980s.
58
 A broader statute was adopted against subsidies by imposing countervailing duties on 
all items. The Tariff Act of 1930 further adopted anti-subsidy measures by giving Treasury 
authority to levy countervailing duties to alleviate any bounty or grant. The idea of an anti-
subsidy remedy later made its way into the original American Proposals for establishing the ITO. 
Although the ITO failed to materialise due largely to disinterest on the part of the United States, 
subsidy regulation became part of the GATT 1947.
59
 
Rules on the use of subsidies and countervailing measures have existed as part of the multilateral 
trading system since the beginning. More specifically, Article XVI of the GATT 1947 contained 
the original rules on subsidies, and Article VI the original rules on the use of countervailing 
measures.
60
  
These original rules were, however, relatively broad. For example, Article XVI of the GATT 
1947 did not define the term "subsidy" and contained little detail as to the types of adverse 
effects that might be caused by subsidies or as to the actions other Contracting Parties could take 
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in response. Article VI provide only three paragraphs regarding the use of countervailing 
measures.
61
  
In response to the need to elucidate the GATT rules on subsidies and countervailing measures. 
The Tokyo Round of multilateral negotiations, which took place between 1973 and 1979, saw 
the establishment of the Agreement on Implementation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and 
XXIII of the General Agreement, mostly acknowledged as the “Tokyo Round Subsidies Code”, 
or “Subsidies Code”. 62 Unfortunately the Subsidies Code, which was a plurilateral agreement, 
did not fully achieve its objectives. It was ratified by only 25 Contracting Parties, and there were 
a number of disputes plus over fundamental concepts that were not defined in the Code. 
63
 
 
Thus, in the Uruguay Round, the rules on subsidies and countervailing measures were once again 
put on the negotiating agenda. The Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration, which launched the 
Round, called for a fundamental review of all the rules on subsidies and countervailing 
measures: Articles VI and XVI of the GATT 1947 and the Subsidies Code. Thereafter the 
Subsidies Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement was born.
64
 
2.5  The WTO jurisprudence on subsidies and countervailing measure 
The WTO regulates the use of subsidies, and regardless of whether they are intended only to 
correct market failures or to address policy priorities of the government involved, they can 
distort international markets. More precisely, a subsidy can introduce a structural competitive 
imbalance into the market for a good which is unrelated to the natural comparative advantages of 
the different countries producing that good. Where this occurs, an unsubsidised good can find it 
impossible to compete with the subsidised good even where the unsubsidised good has the 
intrinsic comparative advantage.
65
 
In the WTO legal framework Article VI of the GATT provides a foundation of where and how 
Members can use countervailing measures against subsidized imports .The Article acknowledged 
the right of any Contracting Party to impose countervailing duties .It has been described as  
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„‟extra duties levied to offset any bounty or subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly. 
subject to two basic constraints: countervailing duties must not exceed the estimated 
direct or indirect subsidy on the manufacture, production or export of a commodity and 
they may not be levied until the importing country has determined that the subsidisation 
causes or threatens to cause material injury to a domestic industry, or materially retards 
the establishment of a domestic industry‟‟. 66  
The Article provided no definition of what a „subsidy‟ or „bounty‟ is nor did it give any clue as 
to how to measure it. It was also silent on the nature of material injury. On the other hand, 
Article XVI only provides for notification of subsidies that could affect either exports or imports 
and provided for discussions on the possibility of limiting the subsidisation whenever the subsidy 
in question could cause or threaten serious prejudice, a factor whose characters were not defined 
in detail.
67
  
Later the article was expanded by the implementation of the SCM Agreement. The purpose of 
the SCM Agreement is to impose multilateral disciplines on subsidies that distort international 
trade. The SCM Agreement also permits WTO Members' responses against subsidised imports. 
Subsidies result from the decisions of governments. The provisions of the SCM Agreement not 
only authorise unilateral action by means of countervailing duties that may be taken against 
subsidised imports, but also establish multilateral disciplines to control the use of subsidies 
themselves.
68
  
Furthermore, the SCM Agreement goes far beyond its predecessors in terms of the level of detail 
and specificity of the rules in respect of subsidies. It establishes detailed disciplines for both 
prohibited and non-prohibited subsidies, together with the definitional provisions on prohibited 
subsidies, lengthy provisions concerning adverse effects of subsidies, and details as to the 
applicable multilateral dispute settlement procedures. 
69
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It is essential to also recognise that the SCM Agreement was meant for subsidies on goods and 
that as regards agriculture product(s), the WTO provides special legislation which is known as 
the Agreement on Agriculture. 
However there is a relationship between the SCM Agreement and Agreement on Agriculture. For 
instance Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture establishes that the provisions of the GATT 
1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement including 
the SCM Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
While, Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement prohibits export and import substitution subsidies 
"except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture". Also Article 10 of the SCM Agreement 
provides that „countervailing duties may only be imposed pursuant to investigations initiated and 
conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the Agreement on 
Agriculture‟. 
 
 In US - Upland Cotton, the Appellate Body stated that agricultural subsidies are subject to the 
SCM Agreement „except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains specific 
provisions dealing specifically with the same matter‟. Therefore, for example, agricultural export 
subsidies that are fully consistent with the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture are not 
prohibited under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. They can be countervailed.
70
 
2.5.1 Categories of subsidies covered by the SCM Agreement. 
The SCM Agreement defines three categories of subsidies, namely, prohibited, actionable and 
non –actionable subsidies. However the last category, that is, non –actionable, subsidies existed 
for only five years (ended on 31 December 1999).
71
 Therefore in this study the focus shall be on 
the available two subsidies which do exist up-to-date.  
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2.5.1.1  Prohibited subsidies 
Also known as red light subsidies, prohibited subsidies are viewed as among the most disruptive 
impediments to the operation of the international trade market.
72
 Article 3 of the SCM 
Agreement singles out the two kinds of such subsidies which are prohibited; export subsidies and 
import substitution subsidies. 
2.5.1.1.1  Export subsidies 
These are subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, „whether solely or as one of several other 
conditions, upon export performance, including the programmes enumerated in the Illustrative 
List of export subsidies in Annex I of the SCM Agreement‟. The Canada-Autos Panel has held 
that, while all practices identified in the Illustrative List are subsidies contingent upon export 
performance, there may be other practices not identified in the Illustrative List that are also 
subsidies contingent upon export performance.
73
Export subsidies can either be direct or indirect.  
Direct subsidies are considered to provide an explicit price subsidy to either the exporting or 
importing agent, lowering the price of the traded good. Also, such subsidies provide an explicit 
price discount that effectively lowers an importer‟s traded price for the product in question. These 
discounts not only include bonuses paid by the government agencies to increase export but also 
transportation, handling and inspection services that are provided on more favourable terms for 
exports than  for goods for sale within the country. Indirect subsidies provide non-price benefits 
that ultimately lower the final cost to importers. The use of indirect subsidies includes the use of 
food aid programs, actions of state trading enterprises, publicly underwritten export credits, 
export promotion activities, and possibly even the combination of domestic policy instrument that 
act like an export subsidy.
74
 
Footnote 4 to the SCM Agreement provides that de facto export subsidies exist when the facts 
demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without having been made legally contingent upon 
export performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings; on the 
other hand, the fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason 
alone be considered to be an export subsidy. For instance, In the case of Brazil-Aircraft, it was 
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held that there is no hint that a tax advantage would not constitute an export subsidy because it 
reduced the exporter‟s tax burden to the level comparable to that of foreign competitors.75  
Moreover ,the Illustrative List in Annex I lists 11 types of export subsidies ranging from direct 
export subsidies to currency retention schemes, exemptions, remissions or deferrals of direct 
taxes on exports (US-FSC),
76
 excessive duty drawback, and provision of export credit guarantees 
or insurance programmes at premium rates, or export credits below commercial rates (Brazil-
Aircraft; Canada- Aircraft).
77
 
 2.5.1.1.2 Import substitution subsidies 
This second category of prohibited subsidies is defined as subsidies contingent, whether solely or 
as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods. Often, these 
take the form of local content requirements. However, Article 3.1(b) talks about „goods‟, and 
local content requirements often comprise not only goods, but also other cost items.
78
 
Any subsidy falling under the provisions of Article 3 shall be deemed to be specific. These two 
categories are prohibited because they are presumed to distort international trade, and are 
therefore most likely to have adverse effects on the interest of other Members. They may be 
challenged through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (multilateral track) on the basis of 
special accelerated procedures, and, if the subsidy is found to be prohibited, it must be 
withdrawn without delay. Prohibited subsidies may also be subject to countervailing measures 
(unilateral or domestic track) if subsidised imports are causing injury to the domestic industry.
79
 
2.5.1.2  Actionable subsidies 
Actionable subsidies are not prohibited. However, they are subject to challenge, either through 
multilateral dispute settlement or through countervailing action, in the event that they cause 
adverse effects to the interests of another Member. Thus, in addition to the existence of a specific 
subsidy, the complaining Member has to show that this specific subsidy causes adverse effects.
80
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2.6  The application of countervailing measures to address unfair trade practices 
Subsidies have long been recognised as damaging to international trade as well as the economy. 
Subsidised industries are able to sell their products in foreign markets at prices lower than would 
otherwise be possible, which distorts trade patterns based on the comparative advantage to 
subsidised industries.
81
 In economics, the law of comparative advantage is defined as the 
situation where a country is able to produce goods or services at lower cost than anyone else
82
. 
 
The SCM Agreement provides multilateral disciplines also known as "multilateral track" by 
invocation of the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism. That is, „if the decision is given to the 
complainant the alleged subsidies has to be withdrawn in case of prohibited subsidies or 
eliminate the adverse effects of the subsidies or withdrawn in case of actionable subsidies‟. The 
applicable rules are enforced through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, in accordance 
with the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
83
  
 
The SCM Agreement also recognises a unilateral or domestic track whereby Members may 
apply countervailing measures after conducting a domestic investigation according to the criteria 
set forth in the SCM Agreement. Specifically, countervailing duties can only be applied when 
subsidised imports are causing injury or threatening to cause injury to the domestic industry 
producing the like product. The SCM Agreement also provides procedural requirements that 
regulate the conduct of countervailing investigations.
84
 
2.6.1  Substantive requirements for the application of countervailing measures 
Part V of the SCM Agreement provides that a Member cannot impose a countervailing measure 
unless it determines that three elements are present: subsidised imports, and material injury to a 
domestic industry, and a causal link between the subsidised imports and the injury. 
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2.6.1.1  Determination of subsidies  
The GATT did not define what a subsidy is so there was a need to clarify this key term in the 
WTO system. The SCM Agreement defines a subsidy as having to comply with four key 
elements to establish its existence. There must be  
I. a financial contribution; 
II. made by a government or any public body  within the territory of a Member; 
III. which confers a benefit; and 
IV. specificity. 
2.6.1.1.1   Financial contribution 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement contains a list of measures that are deemed to provide a 
financial contribution. These include direct transfers of funds, for example, grants, loans, and 
equity infusion, and potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities, such as, loan guarantees. For 
instance, in the European Communities-Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access 
Memory Chips from Korea case 
85
 the Panel held that "the provision of a guarantee involves a 
potential direct transfer of funds", and thus  a " Guarantee constituted a financial contribution in 
the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement". 
 A financial contribution also exists where government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone 
or not collected: for example, fiscal incentives ,such as tax credits; where a government provides 
goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods; as well as where a 
government entrusts or directs a private body to carry out these functions.
86
 
Specifically, the recipient of the financial contribution can be someone other than the recipient of 
the benefit in situation where that entity is sold to someone else as well as where an initial 
government financial contribution has been made not directly. This reasoning was held by the 
panel in of US-Softwood Lumber IV, US –Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products and 
Mexico-Olive Oil.
87
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However, if a measure confers regulatory but not financial advantages, it would not constitute a 
subsidy. For instance, „presuppose that a government temporarily exempts a manufacturing 
facility in financial difficulties from the obligation to observe anti-pollution laws. To the extent 
that there is no element of financial contribution, this would not constitute a subsidy‟.88 
2.6.1.1.2 By a government or any public body 
In order for a financial contribution to be a subsidy, it must be made by the government or under 
the assignment or direction of a government or any public body within the territory of a Member. 
The SCM Agreement applies not only to measures of national governments, but also to measures 
of sub-national governments and of such public bodies as state owned companies.
89
 According to 
case law, as observed in United States-Definitive Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China, a public body is defined as an entity that possesses, exercises or is 
vested with governmental authority. Further, the Appellate Body held that evidence of 
government ownership, in itself is not evidence of meaningful control of an entity by 
government and cannot, without more, serve as a basis for establishing that entity is vested with 
authority to perform a government function.
90
 
A financial contribution made by a private body may still fall under the definition provided 
above, if a government or public body entrusts or directs a private body, that is, if the 
contribution is made pursuant to the government's instructions. For example, if a private non-
governmental organization (NGO) gives technical and financial assistance to coffee growers in 
certain WTO Members in Africa, it would be a case of private, not governmental, assistance, 
most likely unless the financial contribution was made at the direction of a government or public 
body within the territory of the WTO Member.
91
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directed by the government to provide such a financial contribution". 
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2.6.1.1.3 Benefit 
A financial contribution by a government is not a subsidy unless it confers a "benefit". The word 
''benefit'', as used in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, is concerned with the ''benefit to the 
recipient'' and not with the ''cost to government'' (Canada – Aircraft)92. Although the SCM 
Agreement does not provide comprehensive guidance on these issues, the Appellate Body has 
stated in Canada – Aircraft that the existence of a benefit is to be determined by comparison 
with the market place, that is, whether the recipient has received a financial contribution on 
terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the marketplace.
93
 Thus, for 
example, if a government makes a loan to a manufacturer on conditions equivalent to those that 
the manufacturer could obtain from private banks, there is a financial contribution but no benefit; 
under these conditions the loan would not constitute a subsidy.
94
  
2.6.1.1.4 Specificity 
A subsidy fund is characterised as specific if access to that fund is formal or in fact limited to 
certain specific enterprises, industries, groups of enterprises and industries, or to enterprises in a 
specific geographic region.
95
 Although a measure is a subsidy within the meaning of the SCM 
Agreement, it nevertheless is not subject to the SCM Agreement unless it has been "specifically" 
provided to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries. The basic principle is 
that only a subsidy that distorts the allocation of resources within an economy should be subject 
to disciplines. Where a subsidy is widely available within an economy, such a distortion in the 
allocation of resources is presumed not to occur.
96
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  WT/DS70/AB/R paras. 154-155. 
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There are four types of “specificity” in terms  of the SCM Agreement: (i) enterprise-specificity, 
when a government targets a particular enterprise or enterprises for subsidisation; (ii) industry-
specificity, when a government targets a particular enterprise or enterprises for subsidisation; 
(iii) regional-specificity, when a government targets producer in specified parts of its territory for 
subsidisation; (iv) prohibited subsidies, when  a government targets export goods or goods using 
domestic inputs for subsidisation.
97
 
The SCM Agreement covers not only subsidies which are de jure specific (their specific nature is 
derived from an explicit limitation by the granting authority or the legislation pursuant to which 
the granting authority operates), but also those that are de facto specific (the specific nature of 
the subsidy is derived from the facts and circumstances surrounding its application; in other 
words, the subsidy is "in fact" specific). 
98
The same reasoning was adopted by the Panel in 
European Communities-Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access Memory Chips 
from Korea
99
. 
In this regard, Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement provides that if there are reasons to believe 
that the subsidy may, in fact, be specific, other factors listed in the Agreement, such as, the use 
of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain 
enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in 
the decision to grant a subsidy, may be considered. Information on the frequency with which 
applications for a subsidy are refused or approved and the reasons for such decisions are also to 
be considered. The extent of diversification of economic activities within the jurisdiction of the 
granting authority, as well as the length of time during which the subsidy programme has been in 
operation are to be taken into account.
100
 
Therefore it can be clearly stated that non-specific subsidies are those that are in effect generally 
available to and broadly distributed among all enterprises or industries in a country.
101
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2.6.2  Determination of injury 
Article 15(1) of the SCM Agreement requires that a determination of injury must be based on 
positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the subsidised 
imports and the effect of the subsidised imports on prices in the domestic market for like 
products and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic producers of such 
products 
In US Hot-Rolled Steel,
102
 the Appellate Body stated that the term "positive evidence" relates to 
the quality of the evidence that authorities may rely upon in order to justify an injury 
determination. It further explained that the word "positive" means that the evidence must be of 
an affirmative, objective and verifiable character and that it must be credible.
103
 Further in 
Mexico- Definitive Countervailing Measures on Olive Oil from the European Communities
104
 the panel 
held that "the definition of the term 'injury' for purposes of the SCM Agreement encompasses the 
concept of material retardation". Therefore, the Panel did "not find that the first clause of 
subparagraph (i) prohibits the imposition of duties on the basis of a determination of material 
retardation as opposed to determinations of material injury or threat of material injury". 
2.6.3  Threat of injury 
The SCM Agreement provides that a determination of threat of material injury shall be based on 
facts, and not merely on allegation, conjecture, or remote possibility. Furthermore, the change in 
circumstances which would create a situation where subsidised imports would cause material 
injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent.
105
 
In making a threat determination, the importing country authorities should consider, inter alia, 
the nature of the subsidy or subsidies in question, a significant rate of increase of subsidised 
imports into the domestic market indicating the likelihood of substantially increased importation, 
as well as whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or 
suppressing effect on domestic prices and would likely increase demand for further imports.
106
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 WT/DS184/AB/R. 
103
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2.6.4  Causal link between subsidised imports and injury 
Article 15(5) requires a demonstration that „there is a causal relationship between the subsidised 
imports and the injury to the domestic industry producing the like product‟. It must be 
demonstrated that the subsidised imports, through the effects of subsidies, are causing injury. 
This demonstration must be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the 
investigating authority. The same jurisprudential reasoning was also adopted in Mexico- 
Definitive Countervailing Measures on Olive Oil from the European Communities
107
. 
 
Moreover the above mentioned provision requires investigating authorities to examine any 
known factors other than subsidised imports which may be causing injury to the domestic 
industry at the same time. The SCM Agreement provides examples of such: 
 
 “the volumes and prices of non-subsidised imports of the product in question, 
contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive 
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments 
in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry”.108 
2.7 Procedural requirements for the application of countervailing measures. 
Apart from indicating the substantive factors for a Member to apply the countervailing measures, 
the law also provide for procedural requirements for such measures to be applied as follows; 
2.7.1 Initiation of investigation at the request of the domestic industry 
The SCM Agreement specifies that an investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect 
of any alleged subsidy shall be initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of a domestic 
industry.
109
 Such  application will only be valid where there is sufficient evidence of existence of 
subsidy and, if possible, its amount, injury within the meaning of article VI of the GATT 1994 
and a causal link between the subsidised imports and the alleged injury.
110
 Further, it is the 
obligation of the importing country authorities to review the accuracy of such allegation before 
                                                          
107
 WT/DS341/R.  
108
 Article 15(5) of the SCM Agreement.  
109
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110
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the grant of the application and implementation of countervailing measures. The GATT Panels 
have held several times that the failure to properly determine standing before initiation is a fatal 
error, which cannot be rectified retroactively in the course of proceeding.
111
 
2.7.2  Evidentiary requirements for initiation of an investigation 
The SCM Agreement provides for an opportunity to present evidence in writing in respect of the 
proceedings. It states that interested Members and all interested parties in Countervailing Duty 
(CVD) investigation shall be given notice of information which the authorities require and ample 
opportunity to present all evidence in writing.
112
 The same Article provides for different rights 
such as the right to access the file,
113
 the right to a hearing
114
, and the right to be timely informed 
of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply 
definitive measures.
115
 
The authorities must also provide an opportunity for industrial users of the product under 
investigation and for representative consumer organisation in cases where the product is 
commonly sold at the retail level, to provide information which is relevant to the investigation 
regarding subsidization injury and causality.
116
 
However, where the information submitted might be very confidential and the parties unwilling 
to share it or extremely reluctant to provide to their competitors, the law provides for the 
confidentiality principle to be adhered to by the parties.
117
   
2.7.3  Consultations 
The law provides that upon the acceptance of application for investigation, or in any event, 
before the initiation of any investigation, the interested party to the claims and subjected to 
investigation shall be invited for consultation.
118
 The rationale for this is to clarify the matter at 
hand concerning the subsidy allegations, namely, the existence of a subsidy, injury caused to 
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domestic industry, as well as the causal link between the subsidised import and the alleged 
injury.  
2.7.4  Undertakings 
The SCM Agreement contains rules on the offering and acceptance of price undertakings, in lieu 
of the imposition of anti-dumping duties. It establishes the principle that any exporter may enter 
into an undertaking with the authorities of the importing Member, but not the domestic industry 
in the importing member, to revise its prices, or to cease exports at  prices, as a way to settle an 
investigation.
119
In practice ,an undertaking takes place when the government of the exporting 
Member agrees to eliminate or limit the subsidy or take other measures concerning its effects or 
where the exporter agrees to revise its prices so that the investigating authorities are satisfied that 
the injurious effect of the subsidy is eliminated.
120
 
2.7.5  Application of Countervailing Duties  
Countervailing measures take the form of customs duties, which may be in excess of the bound 
tariff provided in the Schedule of concessions of the Member applying the measure.
121
Only once 
totally satisfied that the subsidized imports are causing injury to the domestic industry, a 
Member may impose a CVD.
122
 Therefore when a CVD is imposed in respect of any product, 
such duty shall be levied in appropriate amounts and on a non discriminatory basis. Specifically, 
no CVD shall be levied on any imported product in excess of the amount of the subsidy found to 
exist. By calculating subsidisation per unit of the subsidised and exported product.
123
The SCM 
Agreement also provides that it is desirable that the imposition of the duty is permissive and that 
the duty is less than the margin of subsidasation if such "lesser duty" would be adequate to 
remove the injury to the domestic industry.
124
 
In order to offset or prevent the effect of subsidised goods a contracting party to WTO may 
impose a CVD on such goods. A CVD is a special tariff, in addition to the normal import tariff, 
imposed on imports of subsidised goods in an amount equal to the amount of the countervailable 
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subsidy. Moreover, the international instruments under the international trade provide that 
“countervailing duty “shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of 
offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production or 
export of any merchandise”. 125  
In the WTO CVDs against subsidies can be of the following kinds: 
i) Provisional CVDs  
Under the SCM Agreement, provisional CVDs may be applied before the conclusion of an 
investigation, only if there has been a preliminary affirmative finding of subsidisation, injury and 
causation. In no circumstance can such provisional duties be applied until at least 60 days have 
passed from the date of launching the investigation. Additionally, provisional CVDs must be 
limited to as short a period as possible, and under no circumstances can they be applied for 
longer than four months. 
126
 
ii) Definitive CVDs  
The definitive duties can only be applied on the basis of a final determination in an investigation. 
In precise, before it can enforce a definitive duty, the importing Member must have initiated and 
conducted an investigation in a whole conformity with the relevant provisions of the SCM 
Agreement, and in the investigation it must have arrived at affirmative final determinations of 
subsidisation, injury and causation.
127
 
 
iii) Voluntary undertakings  
Voluntary undertakings signify an alternative to definitive duties. A countervailing duty 
investigation can be suspended without the imposition of CVDs if the Member and/or exporter 
being investigated gives the investigating Member a satisfactory voluntary undertaking that the 
government of the exporting Member agrees to eliminate or limit the subsidy or to take other 
measures concerning its effects and/or the exporter agrees to revise its prices so that the 
investigating authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the subsidy is eliminated. 
128
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2.7.6  Duration and review of CVDs 
Article 21(1) provides that a CVD shall remain in force only as long as necessary to counteract 
subsidisation which is causing injury, and not otherwise. Moreover, the law provides that a 
definitive CVD shall be determined on a date not later than five years from its imposition.
129
 It is 
also crucial to understand that the evidence and procedure shall apply to any review, and that 
such review shall normally be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation.
130
  
2.7.7  Special and differential treatment  
Article 27 of the SCM Agreement recognizes that special regard must be given by developed 
country Members to the special situation of developing country Members when considering the 
application of countervailing measures under the SCM Agreement. Possibilities of constructive 
remedies provided for by the SCM Agreement shall be explored before applying CVDs where 
they would affect the essential interests of developing country Members.
131
 
2.8 Summary 
In the multilateral trading system Members may use trade remedies as redress against fair trade 
practices by using safeguard measures or unfair trade practices such as, dumping and subsidies.  
This chapter sought to provide in a detailed account of the WTO and trade remedies with the 
focus being the available redress against subsidies.  
Despite  there being in place the legal basis and  relevant provisions for  the WTO remedy of 
countervailing measures, most developing countries, including Tanzania, fail to fully utilise  
countervailing measures against unfair trade practices in relation to  subsidies  . 
The following chapter focuses on the contemporary situation relating to subsidised imports in 
Tanzania as a case study, followed by the challenges and constrains facing Tanzania in 
implementing countervailing measures. Although implementing such measures has been a 
challenge to Tanzania, Brazil, which is also grouped as a developing country and the EU have 
been active users of countervailing, measures. Thus, the will be a comparative study of Brazil 
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and the EU since despite the available challenges to implementing such measures these two 
countries have been active and successful users of countervailing measures. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TANZANIA AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES: CHALLENGES AND 
CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania) has been part of the WTO as a member since the 
1990s. Indeed, Tanzania is entitled to all the available benefits that the multi -trading 
organisation has to offer, including the right is to defend her trade interests. Yet despite the fact 
that subsidised imports still continue to be a challenge to domestic industries, Tanzania has not 
been capable of addressing this problem either by implementing CVDs or using the WTO 
dispute body for a complaint against subsidies. This chapter focuses on Tanzania in the 
multilateral trading system and also examines the present situation there with regard to 
subsidised imports. This is followed by a discussion on the challenges and constraints facing 
Tanzania implementing countervailing measures .Finally, there will be a comparative assessment 
of the active users of countervailing measures, namely, the EU and Brazil.  
3.2 Tanzania in the multilateral trade system 
Tanzania became an official member of the WTO on 1 January 1995 by successfully concluding 
its accession process to the Organisation.
132
 It terms of its share of the world‟s total exports 
Tanzania contributes 0.03% since it is a small scale economy country and also grouped as a least 
developing country. It is also crucial to understand that according to WTO data of September 
2012,
133
 the United Republic of Tanzania‟s breakdown of its economy‟s total export range is as 
shown in figure 1. 
 
                                                          
132
 See World Trade Organization „Tanzania‟ available at 
www.http/stat.wto.org/countryprofile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?language=E&Country=Tz  ( accessed on 
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Figure 1 
 
 
By main destination 
1. Switzerland 19.4% 
2. South Africa 18.1% 
3. China 14.3% 
4. European Union 12.1% 
5. Japan 7.5% 
 
 
 
Total export 
Agricultural products
Fuel and mining products
Manufactures
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As regard, import tariffs, Tanzania is a member of the East African Community (EAC) customs 
union along with Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda.
134
 Customs tariffs, rules of origin, 
import prohibitions, and trade remedy regulations have been harmonized through the EAC. 
Tanzania imposes the EAC common external tariff on goods imported from non-EAC countries. 
These import tariffs are levied at an ad-valorem rate on the cost, insurance and freight (c.i.f.) 
value of goods at the point of entry to the EAC customs union.
135
  
As regarding the use of trade remedy instruments, Tanzania is not an active user of such tools. 
As for anti- dumping measures, „Tanzania delegation notified the WTO that it had not yet 
established an authority competent to initiate and conduct such investigation. The delegation 
added that Tanzania has not to date taken any ant-dumping action for the foreseeable future (per 
communication dated 11
th
 June 2011)‟.136  
On the other hand, there is not much information concerning countervailing measures or 
safeguards. However, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures has been 
implemented by the Tanzania Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures Act of 2004.It is the 
core legislation that governs the operation of Tanzania anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures. The Act, expressly, lays down the administrative procedures for the application of the 
two trade remedies.  
In terms of using the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the United Republic of Tanzania is not an 
active user either. Up to date it has not filed any case as a complainant or as respondent. 
However, it has appeared before such body as a third party in three cases against the European 
Community for its export subsidies on sugar.
137
 
 
 
                                                          
134
 Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the establishment of the East Africa Customs Union of 2004. 
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Finally, according to a WTO press release:  
“Members commended Tanzania for its strong support of the multilateral trading system. They 
were unanimous in commending Tanzania for its process of economic reform and liberalization. 
These steps have included the dismantling of import and export license procedures, the 
simplification of the tariff structure, the elimination of foreign exchange controls, and the broad 
efforts by the Government to create an environment more conducive to both foreign and domestic 
investment.”138 
3.3 The current situation on subsidised imports in Tanzania 
A recent study
139
 shows that the like other developing countries subsidised imports still act as a 
challenge to domestic industry. For instance the war pitting cement manufacturers in Tanzania 
against importers of the same commodity in the country is yet to be resolved. Local 
manufacturers are still being adversely impacted by increased subsidized cement imports from 
China, Pakistan, Egypt and India.
140
 Specifically the prices for imported cement are said to be 
lower than those for locally made cement. This is usually due to a number of reason(s) including 
export subsidies and /or lower cost in the country of origin.
141
 
In May 2012, the Ministers of Finance from the EAC of which Tanzania is a member, agreed to 
continue to apply the common tariff rate of 25 per cent instead of the 35 per cent on cement 
under the Harmonized Systems Code for the period of one year. Cement producers have been 
asking for an increase in the cement import tariff since at least 2008 when the EAC Ministers 
removed cement from the list of sensitive products classified under the East Africa Community 
Customs Union Protocol in 2005.
142
 For example, in 2010, the cement manufacturing sector in 
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 See World Trade Organization „Tanzania: March 2000‟ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp129_e.htm (accessed on 31 January 2013). 
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 Illy O (2012)1GEG Working Paper. 
140See Business Times Economic and financial weekly „Cement wars: Imports vs. Domestic product‟ available at  
http://www.businesstimes.co.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=116:cement-wars-imports-vs-
domestic-product&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=57 (accessed on 9 January 2013); also see allAfrica  „Tanzania: 
Higher Taxes Cannot Be Imposed On Cement‟ available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201212110156.html 
(accessed on  9  January 2013). 
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the EAC was asking the East Africa Member states to reinstate the 35 per cent common external 
tariff or add a further charge which is higher than 35% to save the industry from imminent 
collapse because of escalating imports of subsidised and dumped cement from Asia and the Far 
East.
143However, after such plea „Tanzania scrapped the duty entirely, plugging its domestic 
cement industry into an abyss of uncertainties and a shaky future‟.144 
In December 2012, the Minister for Trade and Industry, Dr Abdallah Kigoda, said in Dar-es- 
Salaam that the government is not planning to remove the suspended duties on imported cement, 
but would instead put in place conditions simulate smooth operation. 
145
It is submitted that the 
government should also think of using other option such as applying an administrative 
proceeding such as countervailing duty, so as to offset the effect brought by subsidized cement in 
the country. 
With regards to agriculture, the share of traditional agricultural exports from Tanzania in global 
markets has been shrinking, mainly due to increasing competition from other suppliers and 
subsidized exports.
146
 Walking around supermarkets in Dar- es -Salaam which is the commercial 
city of Tanzania, it is easier to find boxes of orange juice from Dubai, tins of canned beef from 
the UK and butter and cheese from as far away as New Zealand, than it is to find local 
produce.
147
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 See LAFARGE „Local cement manufacturers seek protection from subsidised imports‟ available  at 
http://www.lafarge.co.ug/wps/portal/ug/7_2Latest_news_Press_releases/Detail?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps
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Expressively, Shoprite or Uchumi supermarkets will find it easier to import something than to 
buy it locally. This is so because Tanzanian farmers find it very difficult to compete with western 
farmers due to the fact that their production costs are much lower. These facts were given by 
Professor Pius Mbawala, Tanzania's Deputy Minister for Agriculture and Food Security.
148
 
According to UN figures, approximately 5 million people are involved in cotton production in 
Tanzania, but for the last few years, the industry has remained idle. In practical terms Tanzanian 
cotton farmer can never equally compete with United States cotton farmer due to the fact that 
there are larger cotton subsidies in the United States, as well as greater productivity and lower 
production costs. It is not just cotton. In Tanzania, one sees the effects of subsidies in traditional 
industries, such as beef, wheat and dairy products, but also in non-traditional markets, like 
spices.
149
  
3.4 The Tanzanian approach to subsidized imports 
In order to implement the WTO SCM Agreement, in 2004 the United Republic of Tanzania 
enacted the Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures Act. This Act applied only to the 
Tanzanian mainland.
150
 The Tanzanian Act against dumping and subsidies provides the main 
legal framework governing countervailing measures in Tanzania. As article 24 of SCM 
Agreement provide for institutional requirements, section 4 of Act
151
 establishes the advisory 
committee on subsidies and dumping. Such committee is vested with several responsibilities, 
such as, to advise the Ministry of Industry and Trade of urgent measures necessary for the 
protection of domestic industries from injury or threat caused by subsidy. The committee also 
Advices the Minister on policy issues related to subsidies and countervailing measures and 
recommends to the Minister the imposition of countervailing measures or any other convenient 
action to offset the effect of subsidies.
152
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In Tanzania investigation proceedings can be initiated by an application in writing to the 
Minister.
153
The Act against subsidies also establishes that the proceedings can be initiated by a 
domestic industry or any person on behalf of the domestic industry or by a member of the 
Committee.
154
The allegations will only succeed if there is sufficient evidence that the alleged 
products benefited from a subsidy (in such a case the alleged subsidy was specific). In addition, 
due to the presence of subsidisation the local industries are likely to face a threat of, or material, 
injury.
155
 
The proceedings may be suspended or terminated without imposing provisional measures or any 
countervailing duty. Specifically, when there is a voluntary undertaking by the exporter to take 
reasonable measures to offset the effect of subsidies and only if the committee is satisfied that 
the danger or effect of subsidy has been eliminated.
156
The terms of the imposition of 
countervailing duties on products in Tanzania is made by the Minister after receiving advice 
from the committee.
157
 
3.5 Challenges and constraints facing Tanzania on implementing countervailing measures 
Despite having national legislation to address the issue of subsidies, Tanzania has never been 
able to use such piece of legislation to protect her local industries against threat of, or material 
injury caused by subsidies. The following are the key factors which act as challenges and 
constraints on implementation of countervailing measures in Tanzania. 
3.5.1  Absence of comprehensive national legislation and institutional framework  
National legal and institutional frameworks are the basic requirements for a Member country to 
be competent enough for trade remedy action(s).The rationale behind this is that when the 
domestic producers want to file for protection there must be national regulations which 
prescribes the conditions and proper process to follow, as well as a competent authority that can 
handle the case.
158
  
                                                          
153
 Section 27(1) of the Tanzanian Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures of 2004. 
154
 Section 27(2) of the Tanzanian Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures of 2004. 
155
 Section 22 of the Tanzanian Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures of 2004. 
156
 Section 41(1) of the Tanzanian Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures of 2004. 
157
 Section 55(1) of the Tanzanian Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures of 2004. 
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 Illy O (2012) 20 and; also see Hartzernberg T „et al‟ (2011). 
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The situation in Tanzania is very promising since it has a legal basis on countervailing measures 
after having enacted special legislation charged with administering and regulating anti-dumping 
and countervailing measures.
159
 But it has never applied them due to complexity of the rules, 
lack of financial capacity, and insufficient experts on such matters. However, legislation alone is 
not sufficient; for a Member to be compatible with WTO trade remedies rules and procedure, 
Tanzania is also required to have comprehensive national legislation, including the principal Act 
and supportive regulations. So far the country only has the one principal Act which deals with 
two trade remedies countervailing measures being one of them. 
As regards an, institutional framework, Tanzania  still is facing obstacles since there is not any 
competent authority to deal with countervailing measures, apart from the committee established 
under section 4 of the principal Act
160
 which created the Anti-dumping and Countervailing 
Measures Advisory Committee. This means there must be reasonable steps towards creating a 
competent authority or ad hoc body in charge with investigating and monitoring, and providing 
technical support for countervailing measures to be implemented. 
3.5.2  Financial instability 
Setting in place national trade remedy legal frameworks and institutions can prove very costly to 
a developing nation like Tanzania as well as time consuming. For instance, according to Illy 
Ousseni
161
 it has taken six years and more than USD 10 million for Egypt to build up its trade 
remedy framework. Mauritius has taken more than ten years to have in place its regulatory 
framework for anti-dumping and countervailing measures, and technical assistance was sought 
from the WTO. Thereafter, since the setting up of a fully fledged permanent investigating 
authority was prohibitively expensive in Mauritius, the government decided to simply establish 
an ad hoc team of investigators only called in whenever a case is filed.
162
 Trade remedy 
proceedings involve hearings, field investigation and sometimes sending a team abroad, which 
can prove very expensive and require sacrifice since sufficient funds, is required.
163
 Therefore 
                                                          
159
 Tanzanian Ant-dumping and Countervailing Measures Act of 2004. 
160
 Tanzanian Ant-dumping and Countervailing Measures Act of 2004. 
161
 Illy O (2012) 21.  
162
 Illy O (2012) 21 and Hartzernberg T „et al‟ (2011) 115. 
163
 Agro export project „Solutions for dealing with import surges and dumping (2008)8 hereafter Agro export project 
(2008). 
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having in place a competent investigation authority and running the whole procedural and 
technical issues regarding subsidies is reasonable costly for Tanzania. 
3.5.3 Lack of experts 
Determinations of subsidised import(s) investigations require more a high level of expertise and 
a good team of well trained specialised lawyers, custom officers and economists, among others. 
Putting this team in place is fundamental once the regulatory framework is actively running. 
However, training these experts may gain prove very expensive and keeping them is another 
challenge, particularly in the context of the low salaries Tanzania government can afford. Indeed 
,and this has already been experienced with training programs, such as, the WTO technical 
assistance for developing countries, many of the government officials who receive the training 
leave soon after they return home, either to join the private sector or an international 
institution.
164
 Therefore, due to a lack of human resources Tanzania has not been able to utilise 
the available countervailing measures effectively. 
3.5.4  Local producer competence 
The local producer have hardly any knowledge even of the possibility of filing a countervailing 
measure case, despite the fact that Tanzania enacted the Anti-dumping and Countervailing 
Measures Act in 2004.The private sector, which is essentially made up of individual and small 
companies, is overwhelmed by many technical and organizational constraints, which prevent it in 
particular from taking full advantage of international trade agreements signed by the 
government. Therefore in the end Tanzania will hardly derive any benefit from the multilateral 
trading system.
165
 
In Tanzania, research shows that there is no one strong association which can stand as a shield of 
protection for local producers against unfair trade practices such as subsidised imports. But there 
are of different associations for groups of producers with the aim of protecting only the interests 
of each group separately.
166
For example, Tanzania Coffee Association established in 1997 as the  
successor to the Tanzania Coffee Traders Association is entitled  to assist and advice statutory 
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 Illy O (2012) 21 and Hartzernberg T „et al‟ (2011) 115. 
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 Illy O (2012) 22. 
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 Uliwa P & Fischer D „Assessment of Tanzania‟s Producer Organisations Experience and environment‟ (2004) 
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bodies in Tanzania on all matters affecting the coffee industry,
167
the Tanzania Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association, and the Tanzania Exporter Association to mention but in a few. The 
fact that these associations exist apart  and that there is no unification of  the associations to 
create  one voice has proved to be a challenge, and local producer‟s interests at a time of unfair 
trade practices are  rarely well represented and protected. 
3.5.5  National economic interest 
Like other developing nations the United Republic of Tanzania is also facing the pressure of its 
national economic interest, especially when dealing with subsidised import(s) that come from 
powerful economy countries
168
. In practice economists generally finds that an import restriction 
will reduce the national economic interest of the country that imposes it. The protected domestic 
interest will be better off, but the costs to the other domestic interests will be larger. The reason 
for this is that certain interests have more influence politically than they have value in 
economically; the domestic political process will sometimes choose import protection even when 
it does not serve the national economic interest.
169
  
On several occasions developing nations have not been able to take steps to fight fairly against 
unfair trade practices.
170
In their defence it can be said that it is hard to take measures against 
developed countries of the international relations they have with them or because of the fear that 
their actions will have a negative effect on their exports. As in one of the press release reported: 
” It should be noted that any decision to impose more duties on imported subsidized cement in the 
free market will have long term negative effects on the struggling economy. This is because 
countries which will be affected by the tax increase will also impose high duties on imports from 
Tanzania.”171 
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 See Tanzania Coffee Association „Profile of the Tanzania Coffee Association (TCA)‟ available at  
www.tca.or.tz/aboutus.htm  (accessed on  7 February 2013) 
168
 Finger MJ & Zlate A „WTO Rules that allow New Trade Restrictions: The public Interest is a bastard child 
(2003)2 UN Millennium Project Force on Trade. 
169
 Finger MJ & Zlate A (2003). 
170
 Finger MJ & Zlate A (2003). 
171171
 See allAfrica „Tanzania: Higher Taxes Cannot Be Imposed on Cement‟ available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201212110156.html (accessed on  9  January 2013) . 
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3.5.6  Technical nature and complexity of the WTO rules on countervailing measures 
The WTO rules on countervailing measures are too complex and involve a lot of technical 
aspects for Member to understand them so as to be able to use the SCM Agreement provisions to 
their advantage. In addition, that the legal language used is also very complex for it to be 
interpreted by a person with no trade law background.
172
 For example, when presenting an 
African Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group proposal, Ghana trade officials said that the present 
WTO Agreements on Anti-dumping and Subsidies have become too complex for many 
developing countries, especially LDCs and small and vulnerable economies (SVEs), to 
implement. Ghana added that, in developing countries without any effective institutional 
framework, local industries are wiped out by unfair competition from abroad.
173
 
It has been shown that, a countervailing duty investigation is more complicated than an anti-
dumping investigation, because calculation and estimation are involved in linking a subsidy 
received by an enterprise to a particular unit of the exported good in question.
174
Furthermore, 
much information has to be obtained from the government of the exporting country, which may 
choose not to co-operate fulfilling the investigation requirement and which might be a challenge. 
3.6 A comparative assessment of European Union and Brazil countervailing measures 
law and practice 
In the WTO, the EU and Brazil, among others, have been recognised as active users of the trade 
remedies instruments including countervailing measures. Different practices and specific rules 
have enabled them to be successful in using such tool despite the fact that most developing 
countries, like Tanzania, have failed to use such measures. 
 
                                                          
172
 See Third World Network „Highlights of the LDC Conference Programme of Action Published in SUNS# 7150 
dated 16 May 2011‟ available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2011/twininfo110315.htm ( accessed 06 
February 2013). 
173
 See Third World Network „Highlights of the LDC Conference Programme of Action Published in SUNS# 7150 
dated 16 May 2011‟ available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2011/twininfo110315.htm ( accessed 06 
February 2013) 
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 WTO E-learning (2012)177. 
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3.6.1 The EU and the WTO 
The EU has been a WTO member officially since 1995.The EU presently consist of 27 member 
States which also are WTO members in their own right. Specifically, the EU is a single customs 
union with a single trade policy and tariff. The European Commission, as the EU‟s executive 
arm, speaks for all EU member States at almost all WTO meetings.
175
 
The EU‟s share of the world‟s total exports is 14.86%, that is, agricultural products being 7.4%, 
fuels and mining products 9.4%, and manufactures 80.0%.The EU exports‟ main destinations are 
the United States, China, Switzerland, the Russian Federation and Turkey. Its share of the world 
„s total imports is 16.17% , mainly from China, the  Russian Federation, the United States, 
Norway and Switzerland.
176
 
The EU has been recognised as an active user of  WTO instruments, especially the Dispute Body 
where as the records show the EU has participated as a third party in 130 cases , as respondent in 
73 cases, and in 87 cases as  the complainant.
177
 
3.6.1.1 The EU approach to subsidised imports 
In order to implement the WTO SCM Agreement, the EU Council adopted Regulation 2026/97 
on subsidies, which has most recently been replaced by Regulation 597/2009.
178
 The EU 
Regulation on protection against subsidised imports, as amended, provides the main legal 
framework governing the EU's countervailing measures. „Apart from provisions on the 
definitions and calculation of subsidies, this Regulation is similar to that on anti-dumping, 
particularly with regard to the determination of injury, the definition of an EU industry, initiation 
procedures, and imposition of provisional and definitive measures, as well as, termination of 
proceedings‟.179 
                                                          
175See World Trade Organization „The European Union and the WTO‟ available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/european_communities_e.htm (accessed on 21February 2013). 
176See World Trade Organization „ European Union „  available at 
http://www.stat.wto.org/Countryprofile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?language=E27  (accessed on 21 February 
2013). 
177
 See World Trade Organization „The European Union and the WTO‟ available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/european_communities_e.htm (accessed on 21February 2013) 
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 Hatcher L  „et al‟ EU State Aids (2012)229. 
179See HKTDC „Guide to Doing Business with EU-Germany, UK, France &Italy‟ available at  
http://info.hktdc.com/euguide/2-10.htm (accessed on 12 February 2013). 
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The Regulation provides for the imposition of countervailing duties for the purpose of offsetting 
any subsidy granted, directly or indirectly, for the manufacture, production, export or transport of 
any product originating in a non-EU country whose release for free circulation in the EU causes 
injury.
180
 
When an EU industry considers that imports of a product from a non –EU country are subsidised 
and injuring the EU industry producing the same product, it can lodge a complaint with the EU 
Commission.
181
The proceedings are initiated upon a written complaint by any natural or legal 
person, or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of the Community 
industry.
182
 Where, in the absence of any complaint, an EU country is in possession of sufficient 
evidence of subsidisation and of resultant injury to the EU industry, it shall immediately 
communicate such evidence to the Commission. The complaint must include evidence of the 
existence of countervailable subsidies (including, if possible, of their amount), injury and 
a causal link between these two elements.
183
In addition such evidence must also be well 
supported with information from government/public sources, and publications in the 
international press supporting the allegation the firm makes.
184
 
The complaint is considered to have been made by or on behalf of the Community industry if it is 
supported by those EU producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 % of the total 
EU production of the like product produced by that portion of the EU industry expressing either 
support for or opposition to the complaint. However no investigation is initiated where the 
portion of the EU industry supporting the complaint account for less that 25 % of total 
production.
185
  
                                                          
180
  Article 1(1) of the European Union Council regulation no 597/2009; also see Europa „Anti-subsidy measures‟ 
available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_trade/r11006_en.htm (accessed on 12 February 2012). 
181See European Commission „The EU‟s anti-subsidy policy‟ available at  http://ec.europa.ey/trade/taking-unfair-
trade-defence/ant-subsidy/complaints/  (accessed on 07 February 2013). 
182
 Article 10(1) of the European Union Council regulation no 597/2009.    
183
 See Europa „Anti-subsidy measures‟ available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_trade/r11006_en.htm (accessed on 12 February 2012);  also Article 
10(1),(2) of the European Union  Council regulation no 597/2009.    
184See European Commission „Trade defence‟ available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-
defence/anti-subsidy  (accessed on 7 February 2013). 
185
  See Europa „Anti-subsidy measures „available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_trade/r11006_en.htm (accessed on 12 February 2012); also the 
same have been provided in the European Union Council regulation no 597/2009.     
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Further, any product can be the subject of a complaint, but the anti-subsidy rules do not apply to 
services.
186
 
As regards an institutional framework, the EU Commission is in control. For instance, if the 
complaint contains prima facie evidence of subsidy and injury, the EU Commission will open an 
anti-subsidy investigation. When such investigation shows that; the imports benefit from a 
countervailable subsidy, there is injury suffered by the EU industry,  there is a casual link 
between the injury suffered by the EU local industry and the subsidised imports, as well as that  
the imposition of countervailing measures is not against the community interest, the EU 
Commission may impose provisional countervailing measures .Such measures include a 
temporary security or bond on the imports in question ,provided it acts within nine months of 
launching the investigation. If the definitive measures are warranted, they must be imposed by 
the Council of the EU within 13 months.
187
  
According to EU practice, definitive measures are normally applicable for five years. Measures 
are usually imposed for 5 years.
188
 However, during that time, EU countries may request an 
interim review if they have prima facie evidence that measures are no longer needed.
189
 In terms 
of monitoring measures in force, countervailing duties are collected by Customs authorities of 
EU countries. It does so close in cooperation with different bodies namely the Tax Commission 
and customs departments and the European Fraud Prevention Agency (OLAF)
190
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 See European Commission „Trade defence‟ available at  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-
defence/anti-subsidy  (accessed on 7 February 2013). 
187
 See European Commission „Trade defence‟ available at  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-
defence/anti-subsidy  (accessed on 7 February 2013). 
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 Article 18(1) of the European Union  Council regulation no 597/2009     
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  See European Commission „Trade defence‟ available at  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-
defence/anti-subsidy  (accessed on 7 February 2013). 
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 See European Commission „Monitoring‟ available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-
defence/anti-subsidy/Monitoring  (accessed on 7 February 2013). 
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3.6.1.2 Conditions for imposition of countervailing measures 
Before any measures can be adopted to counteract a subsidy in the EU, the following condition 
must be met: 
1) Specificity  
The EU law requires that in order for any claim on subsidised import to succeed in 
EU countervailing measures to take place, there must be specific in terms of the WTO 
jurisprudence on subsidy. The EU Regulation incorporates the same WTO 
jurisprudential ideas on the term “specificity” as it has been stipulated under Article 3 
191
which provides that only subsidies which are specific can be subjected to 
countervailing measures. 
 
2) Injury 
There must be material injury to the Community industry producing the like product. 
The determination of injury requires an examination of the volume and prices of 
subsidised imports and their consequent impact on the Community industry. In this 
regard the EU Commission verifies whether there has been a significant increase in 
subsidised imports, either in absolute quantities or in terms of market share.
192
 
 
In determining the effect on price, an important consideration is the extent to which 
the import price undercuts the Community producer‟s price. On the other hand, 
determining the impact on the Community producers requires analysis of various 
typical economic factors, such as, market share, output, profits, productivity, return 
                                                          
191
 Of the European Union Council regulation no 597/2009   and article 3 of the SCM Agreement. 
192
 See European Commission „Conditions‟ available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-
defence/anti-subsidy/conditions  (accessed on 7 February 2013) and Article 8(3) of the Of the European Union 
Council regulation no 597/2009.   
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on investment, ability to raise capital growth, and the size of countervailable 
subsidies, among others.
193
 
 
3) Casual link 
The alleged injury to the Community industry must be caused by the subsidised 
import. Although the EU regulation does not clearly indicate this requirement, 
causality is of among key element for countervailing measures to be imposed. 
194
 
 
4) Community interest 
Countervailing measures must not be against the community interest. Although this s 
not required by WTO rules, it ensures that account is taken of the overall economic 
interests in the EU, including the domestic industry producing like product 
concerned, importers ,community industries that use the imported product and will 
ultimately pay a higher price, and, where relevant, the end consumer of the 
product.
195
Specifically, the Regulation provides that the community interest including 
the interest of the domestic industry and users and consumers.
196
 
 
Furthermore, measures, as determined on the basis of subsidization and injury found, 
may not be applied where the authorities, on the basis of all the information 
submitted, can clearly conclude that it is not in the Community interest to apply such 
measures.
197
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 See European Commission „Conditions‟ available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-
defence/anti-subsidy/conditions  (accessed on 7 February 2013) and Article 8(5) of the Of the European Union 
Council regulation no 597/2009.   
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 See European Commission „Conditions‟ available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-
defence/anti-subsidy/conditions  (accessed on 7 February 2013). 
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 See European Commission „Conditions‟ available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-
defence/anti-subsidy/conditions  (accessed on 7 February 2013). 
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3.6.2  Brazil and the WTO 
Brazil acceded to the WTO on 1 January 1995,  
198
 which is the same year as Tanzania‟s 
accession thereto. As a WTO member Brazil has actively and positively participated in the 
Organisation. For instance, despite being grouped as a developing country, Brazil has 
participated actively as a member of the Cairns Group which is a coalition of developed and 
developing countries exporting agricultural products, both during and after the Uruguay Round. 
As the launching of a new multilateral around of trade negotiations was being discussed, Brazil 
pushed for including in the agenda ambitious goals related to market access and the reduction or 
elimination of export and domestic support schemes,
199
 which subsidies fall under the so called “ 
domestic support schemes”. 
Brazil has been a vocal leader of the G-20 that represents developing countries, interests in the 
WTO. Even prior to forming the G-20 group Brazil stood up for including matters critical to the 
developing countries at the WTO, including the most pressing issue of  barriers to trade, as well 
as the treatment of rules covering trade remedies.
200
Regarding the use of the WTO dispute 
mechanism Brazil also has a very promising record: it has appeared as a third party in 74 cases, 
as a respondent in 14 cases and as a complainant in 26 cases.
201
 
According to WTO statistics, Brazil‟s share of the world‟s total export is 1.40%, of which 
agricultural products constitute 33.8%, fuels and mining products 30.4%, and manufactures 
32.8%, mainly to the European Union, China, the United States, Argentina and Japan. On 
another hand, Brazil‟s share of world‟s total imports is 1.28%, mainly from the European Union, 
United States, China, Argentina and the Republic of Korea.
202
 
                                                          
198See World Trade Organization „Brazil‟ available at 
http://www.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=BR (accessed on 21 February 
2013). 
199
 See World Trade Organization „Brazil and the G-20 Group of Developing Countries‟ available at 
http://ww.wto.org/english/res_e/bookp_e/casestudies_e/case/_e.htm   (accessed on 21 February 2013). 
200
  Hornbeck JF „Brazil Trade Policy and the United States‟(2006) 17-18 CRC Report for Congress 
201
 See World Trade Organization „Brazil and the WTO‟ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/brazil_e.htm (accessed on 21/02/2013). 
202
 See World Trade Organization „Brazil‟ available at 
http://www.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=BR  (accessed on 21 February 
2013). 
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3.6.2.1  The Brazil approach to subsidised import(s) 
In Brazil the legislation dealing with regulation and administration procedures regarding the 
imposition of countervailing measures is Decree no 1.751 of 19 December 1995.The decree 
provides that in Brazil countervailing measures may be applied with the objective of 
compensation for subsidies that are granted, directly or indirectly, in the exporting country for 
goods, and which as a consequence cause injury to the domestic industry.
203
 
The decree further provides that the Minister of State in charge of industry, Trade and Tourism, 
and the Minister of finance have the competence to apply, through a joint act, provisional 
countervailing measures or definitive measures and ratify undertakings, based on findings of the 
Secretariat of External Trade (SECEX) of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism, which 
confirm the existence of subsidies and injury arising there from.
204
 SECEX is the responsible 
body for conducting the administrative proceedings as per the Decree provisions.
205
 
The Decree provides that a subsidy shall be deemed to exist when a benefit is conferred in terms 
of two scenarios as follows: if there is in the exporting country any form of income or price 
support that contributes, directly or indirectly, to the increase or decrease of exports of any 
product, or if there is a financial contribution by the government or by a public organ within the 
territory of the exporting country. Brazil incorporated the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures in defining what constitutes a financial contribution.
206
 
Furthermore, in Brazil the actionable subsidy which has to be subjected to countervailing 
measures must be specific
207
, and there must be a causal link between the import of subsidised 
products and the injury alleged to domestic industry.
208
 
                                                          
203
 Article 1 of the Brazil Subsidies and Procedures for the Application of the Countervailing Measures Decree No 
1.751 of 1995. 
204
 Article 2 of the Brazil Subsidies and Procedures for the Application of the Countervailing Measures Decree No 
1.751 of 1995. 
205
 Article 3of the Brazil Subsidies and Procedures for the Application of the Countervailing Measures Decree No 
1.751 of 1995. 
206
 Article 4 of the Brazil Subsidies and Procedures for the Application of the Countervailing Measures Decree No 
1.751 of 1995. 
207
 Article 7 of the Brazil Subsidies and Procedures for the Application of the Countervailing Measures Decree No 
1.751 of 1995. 
208
 Article 21(1) and 25(1) of the Brazil Subsidies and Procedures for the Application of the Countervailing 
Measures Decree No 1.751 of 1995. 
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The Brazil law on countervailing measures defines the term “injury” to mean material injury or 
threat of material injury to a domestic industry already established or material retardation of the 
establishment of such industry.
209
Regarding the volume of imports to be subjected to 
countervailing measures, the Decree stipulates that there must be evidence of a significant 
increase in subsidised imports, either in absolute terms or relative to the production or 
consumption in Brazil.
210
 
The investigation to determine the existence, the degree and the effect of any alleged subsidy can 
be requested by the domestic industry or on its behalf. This can be done by means of a petition, 
in written form and in accordance with the procedures established by SECEX.
211
However in 
exceptional circumstances, the federal government, ex officio may initiate an investigation, as 
long as there is sufficient evidence of the existence of a subsidy, of injury and of a causal 
relationship between them.
212
 
Upon filing the petition SECEX will proceed with the examination of the degree of support or 
opposition to the petition expressed by the other domestic producers of the like product. The 
rationale behind this being to determine if the petition was presented by or on behalf of the 
domestic industry.
213
 
A petition will be considered to have been presented by or on behalf of the domestic industry if 
presented by producers responsible for more than 50% of the domestic production of the like 
products made by the relevant sector of domestic industry. However ,if the domestic producers, 
who support the petition, account for less than 25%  of the total production of the like product 
produced by domestic industry, SECEX may reject and close the case concerning the subsidy 
allegation because it is not a watertight case since it fall under insufficient evidence.
214
 
                                                          
209
 Article 21 of the Brazil Subsidies and Procedures for the Application of the Countervailing Measures Decree No 
1.751 of 1995. 
210
 Article 21(2) of the Brazil Subsidies and Procedures for the Application of the Countervailing Measures Decree 
No 1.751 of 1995. 
211
 Article 25 of the Brazil Subsidies and Procedures for the Application of the Countervailing Measures Decree No 
1.751 of 1995. 
212
 Article 33 of the Brazil Subsidies and Procedures for the Application of the Countervailing Measures Decree No 
1.751 of 1995. 
213
 Article 28(2) of the Brazil Subsidies and Procedures for the Application of the Countervailing Measures Decree 
No 1.751 of 1995. 
214
 Article 30(1)c of the Brazil Subsidies and Procedures for the Application of the Countervailing Measures Decree 
No 1.751 of 1995. 
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One of the unique features which differentiate Brazil‟s countervailing measures law from the 
other Members is on the subject of defence. The law establishes that during the investigation, the 
parties and the interested governments shall have ample opportunity to defend their interests 
before the measures are adopted.
215
Further, the law establishes that the proceedings may be 
suspended without the application of countervailing measures if the government of the exporting 
country agrees to eliminate or reduce the subsidy or adopt other measures concerning the effects 
of subsidisation.
216
 This practice encourages the interested parties to the matter in dispute to 
solve their matter amicably rather than go further and implement the duties .This can be an 
alternative for most developing nations who fear that implementing the duties directly mighty 
destroy international co-operation with the powerful countries. 
3.7 Specific rules of the EU and Brazil countervailing measures law which Tanzania 
may adopt. 
3.7.1 Lesser duty rule 
A Member should impose duties only to the level necessary to eliminate the injury caused by the 
effects of the subsidy.
217
Under the trade remedy agreements, the decision whether the amount of 
the subsidy duty to be imposed shall be the full margin of the subsidy or less is to be made by the 
authorities of the importing Member. The lesser duty rule implies that countervailing duties 
should be less than the subsidy and only high enough to remove injury. The lesser duty concept 
appears to be a worthwhile change in SCM Agreement rules that will at least alleviate some of 
the harm caused to consumers by the imposition of the countervailing duties.
218
 
The use of the lesser duty rule is not mandatory, and the decision of whether to impose a duty 
less than the level of subsidisation found is a decision to be made by the importing Member 
country alone. Nonetheless, the use of the lesser duty is desirable.
219
In the WTO there are 
relatively few countries that implement the lesser duty rule. The European Union has the practice 
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of routinely calculating two separate duties, an injury margin and subsidy margin. The lower of 
the two then is used as a punitive duty.
220
Presently the lesser duty rule is only applied in the EU, 
South Asia, Brazil, South Africa and India. Controversially, the United States, Pakistan and 
Canada do not follow this system. 
221
 
3.7.2 Community interest test 
The application of the community interest test can be explained as a balancing of competing 
interests with the interests of the community industry being given special weight. In practical 
terms, community interests are normally equated with the community industry‟s interest and so 
there is a presumption in favour of the introduction of the measures.
222
 
The EU has chosen to reinforce the concept of the community interest by introducing explicit 
rules in Article 31 of Regulation No 2026/97.
223
The nature of the community interest as an 
essential requirement is expressly acknowledged in the relevant community regulations, in the 
sense that any countervailing duties as determined on the basis of subsidy and injury found, may 
not be applied where the authorities, on the basis of the all the information submitted, can clearly 
conclude that it is not in the community interest to apply such measures.
224
 
The community interest test provides that measures can only be taken if they are not contrary to 
the overall interest of the community, meaning the domestic industry, users, consumers and 
intermediaries.
225
 
It has been argued that ,the relevant provisions of the EU Regulation  have to be interpreted in a 
sense that only if there are convincing arguments not to take any measures, no anti-subsidy relief 
should be granted.
226
 
The Commission enjoys the discretion of imposing countervailing duties even in cases where it 
is concluded that the community interest does not call for such intervention and the application 
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of any measures. Such discretion is vested to the Commission. Moreover, it must be understood 
that most of the signatories of the GATT adhere to the position that, once subsidasation and 
consequent injury are proved, corrective measures shall be imposed without the potentially 
mitigating factor of a public interest clause.
227
 
3.7.3 Best information available rule 
The EU Regulation also establishes the existence of the best information available rule which 
allows the Commission to make its findings regarding subsidisation, injury and casual link on the 
basis of the information available .This opportunity can be used without having to request 
information or to embark on an investigation in order to collect or verify information, in cases 
where the undertakings accused of subsidized export in the community are not willing to 
cooperate.
228
 
This practice also provides a platform where the EU Commission does not have to spend time 
and human resources in order to collect information and documents or to verify the accuracy of 
those provided by the parties, as is the case in the antitrust field. Recourse to the community 
interest permits the concentration of the Commission on the most serious infringements.
229
 
3.8     Summary 
This chapter has shown that subsidies on imports distort trade and accelerate the threat of 
material injury to local industries in the United Republic of Tanzania. Responding to this 
challenge Tanzania enacted legislation on countervailing measures so as to offset the effect of 
subsidisation. Yet till the present subsidised imports still act as  a threat to local industries,  and 
nothing has been done so far because implementing the countervailing measures Act is so 
demanding, in terms of financial and institutional capacity,  sufficient and reliable experts, 
political pressure, technicalities of the WTO rules on countervailing measures, and the 
competence  of local producers. 
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The chapter has also conducted a comparative assessment of two active users of countervailing 
measures, namely, the EU and Brazil .It also indicated the specific features which enable these 
two to excel in the implementation of countervailing measures in dealing with subsidisation. 
After exploring the available challenges and constraints on the implementation of countervailing 
measures in Tanzania and the results of the comparative assessment, the next chapter will deal 
with a way forward for Tanzania to excel in using trade remedy tools to its advantage especially 
when dealing with the issue of subsidised imports. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A WAY FORWARD FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES IN TANZANIA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The study has presented several challenges and constraints which made Tanzania unable to 
utilise effectively of countervailing measures when dealing with subsidization. It has also looked 
at the EU and Brazil, which according to WTO records have been among the active users of 
countervailing measures. The present chapter examines some specific concerns about Tanzania‟s 
countervailing measures law and practice which are impediments. Specifically, the chapter 
makes a compares the countervailing measures law and practice of the EU, Brazil and Tanzania. 
Further, the chapter provides available options which may act as be used by the United Republic 
of Tanzania in order to implement and use countervailing measures against unlawful subsidies. 
4.2 Some specific concerns about the implementation of countervailing measures in 
Tanzania 
4.2.1  Legal framework 
In Tanzania the Agreement on the Implementation of Article IV of the GATT and the SCM 
Agreement have been made part of the municipal law through the enactment of the Anti -
dumping and Countervailing Measures Act of 2004. It is crucial to understand that the existing 
legal regime in Tanzania deals with two trade remedies at once, namely, anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures. Apart from the principal Act, presently there are no regulations to deal 
with either anti-dumping or countervailing measures. 
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Looking at the national legislation available for countervailing measures in the EU and Brazil, it 
is evident that both have enacted specific legislation dealing with subsidies and countervailing 
measures. Whereas the EU Regulation on countervailing measures
230
 has 35 Articles and VI 
Annexure dealing with the regulation and administration of countervailing measures, The Brazil 
decree
231
 has 88 Articles and VI Annexure dealing with subsidies and application of 
countervailing measures.  
Nevertheless, Brazil has several pieces of legislation dealing with trade remedies. For example, 
when it comes to subsidisation imports the country has a special Decree dealing with the 
regulation of and administrative responsibility to deal with, subsidies and countervailing 
measures.
232
 Examples of relevant measures include: Circular 20/96 for April 1996 which 
establishes the requirements of the complaint regarding the initiation of countervailing measures; 
Resolution 9 which establishes the technical Group on Commercial Defence; and Law 9019/95 
which provides for the imposition of anti-dumping duties and countervailing measures.
233
 
Having in place several pieces of legislations dealing with the same issue, is desirable because it 
adds some clarity and detailed information. On the other hand, it might create conflicts of 
interest and in terms of enacting other legislation might cause additional financial costs and be 
time consuming. 
In addition, having focused legislation can be traced even under the multilateral system. Whereas 
in the WTO the SCM Agreement deal only with subsidies and countervailing measures, and ant-
dumping is implemented by the Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994.  
The experience in Tanzania is different: there is a single piece legislation dealing with two trade 
remedies at once. That means that Tanzania lacks comprehensive legislation on countervailing 
measures. 
A great deal has been done in catapulting market forces to drive economic activities. Indeed, 
Tanzania‟s success stories in economic reform have centred largely in this area. In the past few 
years, serious efforts have been directed to stabilising the macro-economic fundamentals, 
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including fiscal and legal stabilise. The Legal Sector Reform Programme has seen that major 
trade related laws are reviewed and new ones are put in place.
234
 To date, however, there is only 
a single law on countervailing measures that was enacted on 2004, a move that is not 
commendable. 
Therefore, since Tanzania already has existing principal legislation on countervailing measures, 
it is a high time for the country to enact specific regulations to guide the principal Act, which 
would be referred to as Regulations on Countervailing Measures. This might be the better 
solution and a step forward to the effective implementation of countervailing measures. The 
same can be seen in the EU‟s countervailing measures laws which are focused and 
comprehensive piece of legislation. This is better than having a single legislation which deals 
with both anti-dumping and countervailing measures. 
4.2.2  Institutional framework 
The SCM Agreement calls for the establishment of a Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures and a Permanent Group of Experts. The permanent group of Experts is 
an institution that reviews the nature of subsidies in line with the discipline of the SCM 
Agreement. It may also issue advisory opinions on the existence and nature of a subsidy if 
requested by a panel or by any member.
235
 
Looking at the EU countervailing measures institutional framework, it operates in a unitary 
fashion, whereby all substantive elements of countervailing proceedings, such as, subsidy, injury, 
causation and public interest, are considered by the same institution. In the EU this function is 
entrusted to the Commission.
236
 It is occasionally discussed whether the competition authorities 
should be involved in a public interest investigation.  
The practice of the EU suggests that the competition authorities do not participate on a 
permanent basis in anti-dumping or countervailing investigations, but they can contribute, if 
needs be. For example, in cases where the proposed measures may considerably affect the 
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conditions of competition or where an ongoing or completed investigation conducted by the 
competition authorities has any relevance to the present trade remedy investigation. This 
approach to the participation of competition authorities in the trade remedy investigation is fair 
enough. 
While an investigation is not complicated by adding the separate considerations of the 
competition authorities, the latter have a right to inform the trade authorities of their opinion. 
Such opinion may be of value, especially in terms of the public interest analysis, which often 
involves certain competition concerns.
237
 
In Brazil the institutional framework for trade remedies is under the Ministry of Development, 
Industry and Trade (MDIC) which is the principle institution. However, the Ministry does not 
operate alone but co-operates with two other bodies. The Minister of MDIC chairs the Chamber 
of Trade known as Câmara de Comércio Exterior (CAMEX) one of the subsidiary institutions, 
the collegiate body that also has representatives of other Ministries. CAMEX rules on the main 
aspects of the trade remedies system, such as the imposition of measures. The Secretariat of 
Foreign Trade (Secretaria de Comércio Exterior, SECEX) is the body in charge of carrying out 
investigations and of submitting reports to CAMEX with decisions and recommendations on 
dumping and subsidies and safeguards cases. SECEX executes this task through the department 
of Trade Defence (DECOM), its technical branch. DECOM deals with carrying out trade remedy 
investigations and supports Brazilian exporters in investigations abroad. Additionally, because of 
its technical expertise in trade remedies, the third role of DECOM is to follow discussions and 
participate in negotiations on trade remedies in international forums, supporting Brazilian 
diplomats who represent Brazil internationally.
238
 
Brazil also has a special technical unit, known as the Technical Group on Commercial Defence 
(Grupo Técnico de Defesa Comercial, GTDC), in charge of the technical examination of SECEX 
proposals on: the imposition of anti-dumping duties and countervailing measures, provisional or 
definitive; the approval of price undertakings in anti-dumping and countervailing investigations; 
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and the imposition of provisional or definitive safeguard measures. It is up to GTDC to inform 
CAMEX about the initiation of anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard investigations.
239
 
Having both principal institution, which is MDIC as well as subsidiary institutions, CAMEX and 
SACEX dealing with trade remedies including countervailing measures, has enabled Brazil to 
excel in the implementation and effective use of trade remedies tools. Tanzania could also adopt 
some of the effective elements found under Brazil practices on trade remedies and incorporate 
some of the ideas. Specifically, not to have the Ministry of Industry and Trade deal with 
everything but creating some subsidiary institutions, such as, a trade unit department which will 
only focus on  trade remedies in Tanzania countervailing measures. 
Regarding the institutional capacity of countervailing measures, Tanzania lacks any competent 
authority. As has been observed in relation to anti-dumping matters
240
, the country has not been 
able to establish a competent authority to deal with either anti-dumping or countervailing 
measures. It must be understood that in order for a country to effectively implement trade 
remedy tools requires having a competent authority in place. The reason behind this is: such 
authority will be entitled to conduct an effective investigation in accordance with all procedural 
requirements of the WTO.  As regards institutional capacity in Tanzania, more has to be done so 
as to enable the country to effectively utilise of countervailing measures and other trade remedy 
instruments. 
4.2.3  Should the public interest play any role in countervailing measures investigations? 
In practice, the trade remedy investigation is a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding. Thus, 
the investigating authorities are expected to follow the rules of natural justice. Specifically, the 
investigation authority has to comply with the principle of „due process‟, which „generally 
requires administrative and judicial proceedings to be fair implemented‟.241 A public interest 
clause in the national legislation serves as a means of access to social economic justice for the 
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adversely affected parties.
242
 It is thought to be a way of balancing producer interests with 
consumer (consumers of the product) interest. Adding a public interest clause would also impose 
due restrain in the application of these measures, as well as make the countervailing measures 
mechanism  competition friendly.
243
 
However, neither the SCM nor the Anti-Dumping Agreement includes industrial users and 
consumers in an obligatory list of interested parties; this issue is left to the discretion of 
individual Members. In practice, the domestic laws of WTO Members rarely specify the 
possibility for industrial users and consumers to become an interested party.
244
 
The EU countervailing legislation‟s most prominent feature consists in its provision for a so-
called community interest or public interest test.
245
 The analysis under the EU public interest test 
consists of various factors, inter alia, an evaluation of likely consequences of applying the 
envisaged measure on the community industry and other interested parties, as well as the 
weighting and balancing of the different interests at stake.
246
 In practice the EU Commission 
normally consider the chain of economic machinist to access the likely effect of taking or not 
talking measures against those operators. Further, under the purview of EU public interest, the 
interests of the upstream industry users (downstream industries) and sometimes consumers are 
taken into account in the Community interest test.
247
 
In practice, the community interest was in several situations either the main reason or one of the 
reasons for the termination of proceedings without imposition of measures. In other cases, while 
Community interest was an important issue, the Community institutions finally decided to 
impose measures. Further, in some situations, measures have not been imposed because of what 
could be termed Member States' own conception of Community interest or simply because a 
necessary majority for the Commission's proposals was not obtain.
248
 
The inclusion of a public interest clause in the Tanzania legislation might add to the uncertainty 
of the proceedings and its administrative complexity. Further, it might also facilitate an increased 
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cost of investigation to the parties and the government.
249
 One of the main arguments of 
opponents is that a public interest clause would “impinge on Members‟ sovereignty” and should 
remain in “the self-interest of every Member”. They argue that public interest is quite complex to 
define and this discretion should be left to individual Member states‟ discretion.250 
4.2.4  Should lesser duty rule play any role in countervailing measures in Tanzania? 
The application of the lesser duty rule is not mandatory upon, but rather desirable to, the WTO 
Members.
251
 The legal basis for this desirable application originated under Article 19(2) of the 
SCM Agreement. If it is recognised that subsidised imports are causing injury to the domestic 
industry, then the decision whether the amount of duty should be the margin of dumping or the 
full amount of the subsidy or less should be made by the relevant governmental authorities and, 
if a lesser duty is adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry, the lesser duty should 
be levied.
252
 
The WTO Members who apply the lesser duty rule have to calculate injury margins. The SCM 
Agreement does not give any guidance on such calculation and arguably gives the Members 
substantial discretion .The lesser duty rule is likely to be ineffective unless there is an 
unambiguous methodology of calculating the injury elimination level. It is therefore important to 
develop a sound methodology of calculating injury margins.
253
 
For example, the EU has the practice of routinely calculating two separate duties namely an 
injury margin and a countervailing duty.
254
The plain meaning of “lesser duty” is that a country 
may opt to impose only a certain duty adequate to remove injury caused by subsidisation. Such 
duty however is not the exactly amount of subsidisation margin.
255
 In practices, some 
jurisdictions, including Brazil and the EC provide for the application of a “lesser duty” than the 
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full countervailing duty calculated if such lesser duty would be sufficient to offset the injury 
caused to the domestic industry.
256
 
The lesser duty rule implies that a duty will be imposed which sufficiently raises the price to 
provide the protection the domestic industry needs to stop suffering injury brought about by 
subsidies, but without providing additional protection.
257
 The WTO rules and jurisprudences 
establish that the application of the lesser duty rule is entirely in the discretion of an investigating 
authority, and the SCM Agreement imposes no obligation on any Member to actually apply such 
rule. Instead, the obligation is to actively “consider” the possibility of offering a remedy, which 
can be the application of the lesser duty rule, prior to the imposition of a definitive duty.
258
 
In Tanzania, the anti-dumping and countervailing law recognise the use of lesser duty. It 
establishes that; 
“…..the decision whether the amount of the countervailing duty to be imposed shall be the full 
margin of subsidisation or less. Further where a decision to impose countervailing duty is made, 
the duty imposed shall be less than the margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove 
the injury to the domestic industry.”259  
Having the  provision dealing with the lesser duty rule can be considered as a platform for the 
applicability of such duty but since the current legislation does not goes further on how and when 
should lesser duty rule be applied is still a challenge for its applicability. Also, since there is no 
regulation which explains its application in detailed, it is high time for the country to enact a 
regulation that fill‟s the gap which the principal Act. It has also been observed that the 
methodology used by the users of lesser duty, such as the EU is complex and complicated. 
Therefore Tanzania might opt not to following the footsteps of EU and rather adopt the practice 
of the United States and Canada of not calculating injury margins. These two countries use only 
the subsidization margin to determine the countervailing duty.
260
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4.3 Available options for Tanzania 
It is an undisputable fact that when it comes to the implementation of WTO Agreements, such as, 
the SCM Agreement, developing countries such Tanzania, faced several challenges and 
difficulties.
261
 These were foreseen and several efforts have been made under the multilateral 
system to overcome them. There are various options which Tanzania can use so as to at least 
become competent in using WTO benefits to its advantage and to protect its local industries 
against unfair trade practices, such as subsidisation. Such available potential options include; 
4.3.1  Creating a regulation on countervailing measures 
Having in place specific legislation has proved to be of significance: it would provide detailed   
procedural and substantive requirements for countervailing measures to operate. The same has 
been experienced at the WTO level which has a special agreement dealing with subsidies and 
countervailing measures, adopted by Members including Brazil and the EU. At present there is 
legislation in Tanzania but it lacks comprehensiveness. Therefore it is high time for the country 
to enact a regulation dealing with the regulation and administration of countervailing measures. 
This would also create an opportunity for Tanzania to incorporate some new ideas which are still 
lacking in the present time in the Act, such as, lesser duty rule and public interest. This will make 
the regulation more effective and easy to implement and use. 
4.3.2  Establishing trade remedy unit under the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
It is important to note, however, that having a law in place is one thing, enforcing it is yet 
another. Indeed, it would appear that a central problem that features prominently in Tanzania is 
the institutional capacities of regulatory bodies charged with the task of trade remedies. 
The present trade remedy institutional framework is vested in the Tanzania Ministry of Industry 
and Trade and a special Committee on Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures. The 
examination of the EU and Brazil laws and practices on countervailing measures has shown that 
having an independent institution dealing only with trade remedies is of great importance since it 
provides room for experts to deal with the matter effectively. So in terms of monitoring, 
supervising and accountability it is more desirable to have an independent institution. In 
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Tanzania the creation of trade remedy unity under the Ministry of Industry and Trade would 
enable the country to be more accountable, and monitor and utilize effectively the 
implementation of trade remedies including countervailing measures, for the advantage of the 
nation. 
4.3.3  Participating actively as a third party in the WTO dispute settlement process 
The WTO dispute settlement process provides for equal opportunity for Members to participate 
as third parties to any dispute. The law states:  “Any Member having a substantial interest in a 
matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) shall 
have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the panel.‟‟262 
This is not an absolute right; it can be limited where parties to a dispute deny the addition of a 
third party to the dispute but this is very rare. The WTO law creates room for a Member state to 
choose whether to include other parties to the dispute or not. Under GATT Article XXII the law 
makes it clear that party to a dispute can consult with any contracting party or parties in respect 
to any matter for which it has not been able to find a satisfactory solution.
263
 GATT Article 
XXIII provide that parties to a dispute under the WTO can decide to have their dispute between 
them solve and to exclude others.
264
 
Rationale behind for the participation as a third party includes: acquiring skills, knowledge and a 
proper understanding of the Dispute Settlement Understanding procedure. Such skills and 
knowledge can also be used in the future when the country is ready to file a complaint. Not only 
that, the DSB provided a platform for clarity of the WTO rules.
265
 The most active participant as 
a third party to the DSB such as Brazil who participated  in 74 cases 
266
 and the EU  in 131 
cases
267
, have become the active users of the WTO trade remedy tools as well as dispute 
mechanism. 
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Participating as a third party can be viewed as an unlimited opportunity for Tanzania as a 
developing country to experience the WTO dispute mechanism since stepping in as a 
complainant is considered to be difficulty due to several reasons. Hence Tanzania has to utilise 
this opportunity effectively because by participation it has nothing to lose but much to gain. 
 
4.3.4   Building capacity on trade  
It is an undisputable fact that in the United States of America and Europe there are over 100 law 
professors teaching aspects of WTO law to many students of trade law.
268
 In Tanzania there are 
not enough private lawyers and trade experts to advice local firms and trade associations or 
companies on WTO rights, as well as to work with the government to defend those rights in 
WTO litigation and settlement negotiation.
269
 Even in the Ministry of Industry and Trade there 
are not enough experts on trade and related matters to handle trade remedy instruments, such as 
countervailing measures. 
There has been a range of commitments made to developing countries after the (Doha Round 
dubbed the Doha Development Agenda (DDA)), particularly in terms of improving market 
access for developing countries‟ agricultural and non-agricultural products; resolving 
implementation arrangements for various agreements relating to trade and investments; and 
providing additional assistance for capacity building to developing countries, to mention in a 
few.
270
 
For example developing countries have different approaches to running WTO cases since its 
quite expensive and complex to do so. Some countries, such as Brazil, use a combination of 
internal resources and international law firms. Brazil has made an internal commitment to 
building its in-house capacity to run disputes.
271
 Therefore, since Brazil has outstanding strategy 
in terms of capacity building in relation to trade the country has managed to be an active 
participant in and user of the WTO process. 
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4.3.5  Technical assistance 
Assistance to developing countries has always been on the WTO's agenda,
272
 Technical 
assistance for trade policy, negotiations and rules implementation of the WTO law and practices 
usually consists of activities, such as, seminars, workshops, training programs on trade rules and 
procedures, courses on negotiating skills, legal advice and assistance with preparing draft laws, 
technical missions, the provision of manuals, guides, and documents, and/or support for research 
and data collection.
273
 
Technical assistance involves partnerships among a great number of agencies in both donor and 
recipient countries, each of which usually has its own distinct priorities, operating arrangements, 
timeframes and financial resources.  
„Donors include multilateral and bilateral development agencies, NGOs, industry groups, 
academic centres, think tanks and philanthropic foundations. Key multilateral agencies involved 
in implementing trade related technical assistance include the International Trade Centre, 
UNCTAD, UNDP, the World Bank, WTO and  AITIC. Also engaged are regional organizations 
and development banks, such as, UNECLAC and the Inter-American Development Bank as well 
as UN specialized and voluntary agencies, such as WIPO‟.274  
Additionally, in recent years, the establishment of several pro-bono services in international law 
firms for developing countries has provided another option for some countries.
275
 
On the other hand, Tanzania must also be aware that technical assistance comes with its own 
unexpected challenges as well as problems, such as, inadequate funding, biased content, donor-
driven priorities, inadequate assessment and articulation of needs and weak support for local 
capacity.
276
Therefore technical assistance should not make the country rely solely on it, in whole 
but the country should have other strategies for deal with its trade issues and challenges. 
 
 
                                                          
272
 See World Trade Organization „Building capacity‟ available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/build_tr_capa_e.htm (accessed on 21 March 2013) 
273
 Deere C (2005) 3. 
274
 Deere C (2005)3.  
275
 Deere C (2005) 20.  
276
 Deere C (2005).  
 
 
 
 
80 
 
4.4 Summary 
As noted above, the implementation of countervailing measures in Tanzania is possible, since it 
has taken the step of enacting national legislation which provide for a legal basis of the use for 
countervailing measures. Yet there are several concerns about the existing countervailing 
measures regime in the country: the present legal and regulatory framework, the institutional 
framework, and current practices when compare to the EU and Brazil that are active users of this 
trade remedy tool. The present chapter has sought to compare the countervailing measures law 
and practice of Tanzania, the EU and Brazil. It further provide for the available potential adopt 
which Tanzania might opt in order to make effective use of countervailing measures. The next 
chapter will provide a conclusion and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1  Conclusion 
It is an undisputable fact that subsidise imports and domestic products are not an equal terms 
especially when such products are from developing countries like Tanzania. Therefore WTO 
rules on subsidisation provide a shield of protection which developing countries may use when 
desirable or appropriate against subsidised imports. Yet records show that developing countries 
like Tanzania have never grabbed such potential opportunity against subsidised imports while 
their goods and agricultural products are badly affected by such unfair trade practices. The SCM 
Agreement has substantive and procedural provisions against subsidisation, namely, the national 
track, where a Member may impose countervailing duties or the lesser duty rule to offset the 
effect of subsidies, and the multilateral track, where a Member uses the WTO dispute settlement 
body. 
 
 Several reasons have explained the challenges and constraints on the implementation of 
countervailing measures upon proof that there has been a financial contribution made by a 
government or any public body or if there is any form of income or price support and a benefit to 
a local industry in the country where the imports originated. Such reasons include: lack of 
comprehensive national legislation on countervailing measures, financial instability, lack of 
institutional capacity, absence of skilled and competent experts on trade, inadequate private 
sector capacity, complexity of the WTO rules on implementation of countervailing measures and 
national  economic interest, to mention in a few. 
 
Experience shows that some other countries, such as Brazil, which is also grouped as a 
developing country per WTO standards and the EU have excelled in the use of countervailing 
measures despite the challenges mentioned above. To explain the success story of the use of such 
trade remedy tool, this study has shown that the two countries, unlike Tanzania, have their own 
strategies and practices which empower them to be active users. For instance, they both have 
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specific legislation dealing only with subsidies and countervailing measures, and Brazil and the 
EU have competent authorities which deal with monitoring and administering countervailing 
measures, both have been using the lesser duty rule in their legislation to counteract  
subsidisation. Also the EU law on countervailing measures contained a public interest clause 
which plays a great role in securing the interests of the EU community and industries before the 
implementation of countervailing measures. Last but not least both Brazil and the EU have been 
active users of the WTO dispute body as third parties, which have also contributed to their 
success in utilising countervailing measures and other trade remedies to their benefit. 
 
Looking at the current situation as regards subsidise imports in Tanzania, this study has shown 
that subsidised imports threaten and cause material injury to domestic industries. Therefore there 
is a need for a country to think about how to effectively protect its local industries either in a 
unilateral way, by the imposition of countervailing duties, or by choosing the multilateral track,  
to use the WTO dispute body not necessarily as a complainant but as a third party, so as to 
become familiar with the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and practices as well as to build 
confidence in the use of such trade policy tool. In terms of a legal regime, the Tanzania 
government must also be aware that having legislation alone is not enough. There must be 
further efforts to make such legislation work for the better. In order to back up the existing 
legislation on the implementation of countervailing measures, the country needs to have 
comprehensive regulatory and competent institutional frameworks so as to be able to utilise the 
WTO trade remedies such as countervailing measures. 
 
 Further, the Tanzania government must also be aware that in order to implement countervailing 
measures especially on the unilateral track is very demanding and costly. Furthermore, to 
participate as a third party to WTO disputes in which Tanzania has an economic interest is 
optional, but might create a platform for it to acquire skills and experience to handle cases and to 
be more familiar with the WTO jurisprudence. Nevertheless both ways, namely, the unilateral 
track and the multilateral track, are desirable and the country can utilise them. It was possible for 
Brazil which is also grouped as developing country like Tanzania, so even Tanzania can do it if 
there are more efforts and strategies, some of which the present study has attempted to explicate. 
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This study supports that further research be carried out on other trade remedies namely ant-
dumping and safeguard measures. Thus, if Tanzania fails to utilise countervailing measures, it 
should explore the possibilities of using anti-dumping measures whereby dumping products 
exists or use safeguard measures where appropriate. 
5.2 Recommendations 
In the light of the preceding study on the challenges and constraints facing the implementation of 
countervailing measures in Tanzania the following recommendations are made. 
5.2.1 General recommendation 
The current legal and regulatory framework on the implementation of countervailing measures 
has to be reworked: either through some amendment thereof or by the enactment of a specific 
regulation for countervailing measures. Further, the inclusion of the public interest concept in the 
legislation is also recommended; the previous chapter has shown that the public interest test has 
played a great role in the effective use of countervailing measures. The current legislation also 
includes the use of the lesser duty rule, but little has been provided for it, by the present 
legislation; therefore the new regime on countervailing measures should indicate the 
applicability of the lesser duty rule more clearly. It is submitted that, if Tanzania manages to 
have comprehensive national legislation on countervailing measures it will be of great assistance 
and enable the country to utilise such trade policy tool effectively, since  any act against unfair 
trade practices, such as, subsidies, will be supported by a strong legal basis and justification. 
5.2.2 Specific recommendations 
Apart from the general recommendation, there are specific recommendations which work hand 
in hand with the general recommendation. 
5.2.2.1  Tanzania government 
The government of Tanzania is the key institution when dealing with international economic 
relations and related matter. Therefore this study recommend the following for the government 
so as to facilitate the implementation of countervailing measures against unfair trade practices or 
when it has to deal with the use of trade remedies ,such as dumping; 
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i) Third party participation in the WTO disputes. 
 Tanzania has a good foundation for using the WTO dispute mechanism as a third party:  it has 
appeared before the dispute body three times on sugar cases. However, this study recommends 
that Tanzania has to continue to participate more as a third party so as to continue to build 
confidence and experience and to become familiar with the WTO jurisprudence. The EU and 
Brazil can be seen as a point of reference since they are active users of the WTO disputes process 
as third parties, and therefore it is no wonder that their law and practice on trade remedies is 
more advanced and competitive. This participation will also help the Tanzania government to 
have in place comprehensive legislation on trade remedies. Also, when the need arises to 
implement trade policy tools such as countervailing measures, the country will establish their 
legal claims a on strong basis derived from what it has experienced and what the WTO legal 
instruments and dispute body provide for the applicability of such redress. 
ii) Utilising available technical assistance.  
The Tanzania government still needs technical and legal advice as well as skills in respect of 
WTO law and practice. Such assistance should not only focus on the technical assistance but also 
on the implementation of various WTO Agreement measures, including countervailing measures. 
Such assistance should start from within Tanzania which is blessed to have the Trade Policy 
Training Centre in Africa (TRAPCA) locked in Arusha. Furthermore, it can seek technical 
assistance from TRALAC, situated in South Africa, the WTO itself, and other organisations such 
as, the World Bank and the Advisory Centre on Trade Law (ACWL) both located in Geneva. As 
explained in the previously chapter, seeking technical assistance is highly recommended for the 
government, to acquire enough support and assistance when dealing with trade and related 
matters. 
When the government obtains such technical assistance, efforts must also be made to reinforce 
its capacity building efforts. This can be done by the establishment of WTO law and practice 
schemes or projects for government officials, civil servants, the public at large, and the private 
sector. The establishment of awareness programmes about the WTO is of great significance and 
the government has to initiate and monitor such projects as well as evaluate them regularly. 
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iii) Enhancing the alliance between government and the private sector.  
The government must provide a platform which facilitates co-operation between it and the 
private sector. The rationale therefore is that it is the interests of private sector which the 
government represents in international trade meetings, but it is the private sector that conducts 
trade and which is badly affected by unfair trade practices, although consequently the 
government is get affected by such unfair trade practices. The government also needs to get 
information from local industries and companies to justify redress, such as the implementation of 
countervailing measures .If there is no room for co-operation between the two, the problem of 
unfair trade practices will never be resolved effectively. 
iv) Building up strong co-operation with institutions dealing with trade, inter alia, academic 
institutions, non-governmental organisations, trade associations as well as trade law chambers. 
One of the challenge and constraints which faces Tanzania is the lack of enough skilled and 
competent experts in the trade arena. However, Tanzania has potential academic institutions 
TRAPCA being one of them, which is the centre for trade law in African. Therefore more efforts 
must be made to make sure that the government promote and support the existence of such 
institutions, and where necessary the government should train more government officials and 
senior and junior trade officials to increase the human capital which will be effectively used to 
advance the interests of the government and other stakeholders from the private sector, when 
dealing with international trade matters, such as addressing the issue of unfair trade practices. 
5.2.2.2  Ministry of Industry and Trade in Tanzania 
A trade remedy unit needs to be created within the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Having an 
independent unit composed of lawyers and economists will enable Tanzania  not only to smooth 
the operation of  WTO law and practice by advising its delegation during meetings and 
negotiations, will also help Tanzania to monitor  trade practices within the country, and when 
needed to work on claims regarding unfair practices, such as dumping and subsidisation. This 
unit can also be constituted as an ad hoc group of trade experts that will be used only when there 
is an immediate need. Regarding the human resources for such unit the Ministry has to co-
operate with academic institutions and associations dealing with trade related matters within and 
outside the country so as to get competent and reliable human capital. 
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5.2.2.3 Tanzania private sector 
The available trade associations and private enterprises should establish a single agency that 
deals with the investigation and filing of complaints regarding unfair trade practices such as 
subsidisation .This agency should be linked directly to the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Thus 
when any local industry discovers that there is an unfair trade practice, the agency should act as 
its representative with regard to  the claims  and before pursuing further action  must satisfy itself 
that there is a need to ask for measures, such as countervailing measures, to be taken by the 
government. Further, the private sector must also strengthen co-operation and communication 
with the government, since as a sector its interests can only be protected by the government 
which will enter into negotiations and conclude international economic relations and contracts on 
behalf of local firms, business associations and private enterprises. The international trade 
system deals with the interest the States and not of private sectors, such as, companies, industries 
or trade associations. 
5.2.2.4 The WTO 
Many efforts have been made to see that the developing nations benefit from the WTO, such as, 
technical assistance and capacity building efforts. But in my opinion more effort is needed to 
monitor and evaluate to these projects made for developing nations. Great emphasis must be 
placed on  seeing that the schemes for technical and capacity building provide real benefits 
provide fruits for such nations, by evaluating physical evidence rather than relying on 
documentary evidence only. 
Therefore, the study has managed to show three things namely; first is that this study has shown 
various challenges and constraints on the implementation of the countervailing measures in 
Tanzania presently. Secondly, the study provides for potential opportunities enabling Tanzania to 
implement countervailing measures. Thirdly, this comparative study has revealed various lessons 
which Tanzania mighty opt to use from the EU and Brazilian law and practice. The two countries 
have been active users of countervailing measures and other WTO instruments.  
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